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Pipelines & Power-Lines:
Building the Energy Transport Future
JAMES W. COLEMAN*
The United States is in the middle of three profound energy
revolutions—with booming production of renewable power, natural
gas, and oil. The country is replacing coal power with renewable and
natural gas power, reducing pollution while saving consumers money.
And it has dramatically cut its oil imports while becoming, for the first
time in half a century, an important oil exporter. The United States is
on the cusp of an energy transformation that will provide immense
economic and environmental benefits.
This new energy economy will require massive investment in energy
transport—especially power lines to bring wind and solar power to
market and gas pipelines to back up these renewable sources. But
increased interest from overlapping jurisdictions in energy transport
approvals has resulted in delays and uncertainty that make private
companies wary of long-term capital investments in new energy
facilities. The drive for more careful and holistic environmental
assessments of new energy facilities has also repeatedly delayed new
infrastructure. And land-owners and property rights groups are
increasingly asking the courts to curtail the use of eminent domain by
pipeline and power-line companies.
This Article develops a unified scholarly and policy approach to these
high-profile threats to energy transport investment. Although most often
discussed in the context of controversial oil pipelines, these threats are
actually a far greater danger to investment in cleaner power sources
like wind, gas, and solar. At this pivotal moment, this Article describes
how reforming energy infrastructure reviews can lower the cost of
investment in a new energy economy while accommodating increased
public interest in pipelines and power-lines. It proposes legislation to
ensure a comprehensive, thorough, and unified approval process for
energy transport projects.

* Assistant Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law. Special thanks to William Boyd,
Ann Carlson, Sharon Jacobs, Alexandra Klass, Sanne Knudsen, Sarah Krakoff, Doug Kysar,
Jed Purdy, Jim Salzman, David Spence, Shelley Welton, and workshop participants at the
University of Colorado-Duke Energy & Climate Workshop, University of Lucerne Energy
Law & Economics Workshop, and Cornell Energy Institute.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is in the middle of three profound energy revolutions.
First, the falling cost of wind and solar power have made these sources the
cheapest options in many parts of the country. Second, directional drilling and
hydraulic fracturing—or “fracking”—has unlocked new reserves of low-cost,
clean-burning natural gas from shale formations, and this gas is now powering
new gas power plants that can easily back-up intermittent sources like wind and
solar power. Third, fracking has also dramatically increased production of oil,
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making the United States the world’s biggest petroleum producer and, for the
first time in decades, an important oil exporter.
Each of these three revolutions is creating a pressing need for long-distance
energy transport, and every new project costs billions of dollars. Wind power is
cheapest in the prairie states and needs long-distance power lines to carry it to
the urban centers that need power in the Southeast and West Coast. Natural gas
is expensive to transport because it is a gas: it must either be sent by air-tight
steel pipelines buried in the ground or be sent to massive facilities that can cool
it until it becomes a liquid and loaded onto specialized tankers for shipment by
sea. Oil is the easiest to transport of these three commodities because it is a
liquid, so it can be moved by pipeline, barge, or rail—but even an interstate oil
pipeline costs billions of dollars.
Energy transport policy is undergoing similar upheavals. Increased public
interest in climate, infrastructure, and energy issues has put increasing pressure
on the established system for approving energy transport projects. The federal
government has, at times, pushed for a larger role in considering proposals for
oil pipelines and power transmission, which traditionally have been assessed by
the states. Some states have pushed for a role in regulating interstate natural gas
pipelines, which are traditionally under federal regulation. Native American
groups have pushed for a larger role in approving infrastructure that could
impact their historical homelands—which go beyond reservation lands to cover
nearly all of the United States. Land owners have asked state and federal courts
to limit the use of eminent domain for pipelines and power lines. And climate
activists increasingly demand that governments and courts impose expanded
environmental reviews and new substantive standards on energy transport
projects to ensure they do not endanger the globe.
These simultaneous energy market and energy policy revolutions are on a
collision course: just as U.S. energy markets are demanding massive new
investments in power and fuel transport, changing U.S. energy policy is making
investors wary. Multi-billion-dollar investments in power lines, pipelines, and
liquefied natural gas facilities will only pay off over decades. Even the work
necessary to submit an application for energy transport—entering transport
contracts, securing easements, applying for government approvals, and
purchasing equipment and materials—often costs billions of dollars.1 The larger
1 See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North

American Free Trade Agreement, TransCanada Corp. v. United States, at 1–2, 27 (2016)
(requesting more than $15 billion in damages and noting that the company had already spent
billions of dollars because “before construction can begin, it is necessary, for example, to
secure thousands of land easements, purchase equipment and hundreds of miles of pipe, and
enter into long-term contracts with shippers to transport their oil” and that transport
companies cannot “wait for the issuance of a permit to begin this long lead time work
because, under State Department rules, if construction of a pipeline does not begin within
five years after a permit is issued, the permit expires”); Licia Corbella, Editorial: Death of
Petronas LNG Project a Wake-up Call for Canada, CALGARY HERALD (July 27, 2017),
http://calgaryherald.com/business/energy/editorial-death-of-petronas-lng-project-a-wakeup-call-for-canada [https://perma.cc/5DWM-PLKV] (noting that cancelled liquefied natural
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the risk that a project will not be approved, or that policies will artificially lower
its profits in coming years, the more money investors must be paid to
compensate for this uncertainty. Consumers ultimately pay these higher costs.
They pay a larger risk premium to investors willing to build energy transport.
Or, if investors shy away from these investments, consumers forgo the benefits
of cheaper oil, gas, and renewable power that they would otherwise receive.
This Article seeks to avoid a collision of these energy market and energy
policy upheavals, advocating principles that can accommodate increased
interest in energy policy while, at the same time, providing increased certainty
to energy transport investors. Uniquely, it addresses energy transport as a
whole—it shows how power-lines, pipelines, and other energy transport
methods are similarly impacted by cross-cutting questions of federalism,
eminent domain, and environmental assessment. In braiding together strands in
the existing energy law literature, it demonstrates the necessity of a broader
perspective. For example, climate campaigners often take a “kitchen sink”
approach to pipeline litigation: arguing for any procedural or substantive rule
that can stop new fossil fuel infrastructure. This Article’s comprehensive
approach shows how new procedures developed in these pipeline battles will
also slow the new power transmission that is necessary to transition the United
States to a low carbon economy. By revealing the internal architecture of energy
transport law, this article serves as a blueprint for all parties interested in
changing the U.S. energy system, demonstrating which supporting policies may
be safely removed, and which cannot be altered without damage to the rest of
the system.
Part II explains how booming production of U.S. renewable power, natural
gas, and oil is creating a pressing need for more power lines and pipelines. Part
III documents how procedures for approving energy transport infrastructure are
changing as a result of pressure from the federal government, states, groups, and
land owners. It shows how these procedures are common to pipelines, power
lines, and other methods of energy transport—showing how pressures on one
type of transport inevitably affect other modes of transport. It concludes by
showing why climate campaigners would be better served by pursuing
substantive regulations that would surgically target fossil fuels rather than
imposing new energy transport procedures that will have collateral impacts on
renewable power transmission. In doing so, it explores the complex distinctions
between substantive, cross-cutting, and procedural energy transport laws,
showing which laws should be targeted by those who want to transform the U.S.
energy system.

gas (LNG) project spent $400 million moving through “federal and provincial regulatory
processes” and billions securing natural gas reserves). See generally James W. Coleman,
Energy Market and Policy Revolutions: Regulatory Process and the Cost of Capital, in 5
ENERGY L. & ECON. 159 (Klaus Mathis & Bruce R. Huber eds., 2018) (discussing the various
difficulties with obtaining approval for energy transport infrastructure and their associated
costs).
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Part IV explains how these changing procedures are increasing uncertainty
for energy transport investors, raising prices for energy consumers, and
endangering U.S. efforts to create a new energy economy. This Part also
explains how this uncertainty is particularly deadly to efforts to lower U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions because high-carbon sources like oil may be able to
get by using makeshift transport methods such as rail, road, and water transport,
whereas renewable power absolutely must have long-term transport
infrastructure. A central irony of energy systems is that our dirtiest sources, coal
and oil, are easiest to transport, and our cleanest sources, gas and renewables,
are most dependent on expensive long-term infrastructure. Thus, a myopic focus
on oil pipelines can be dangerous: the oil industry will be fine whether or not
new energy transport is built but the renewable industry is almost entirely
dependent on this infrastructure.
With the growing problem defined, Part V advocates four principles that
can help accommodate increased interest in energy transport while, at the same
time, increasing certainty for energy investors. It labels the first principle “wide
participation, one decision-maker,” recommending that states go further to
ensure that federal interests are represented in state approval procedures and
vice versa, but counseling against a dual-approval process that would increase
uncertainty by allowing re-litigation of issues already decided in one forum. The
second principle is that energy transport approval processes should not change
mid-stream after an application is made. The third principle is that applications
for energy transport facilities should be subject to timelines that could motivate
reasonably prompt actions from decision-makers. The fourth principle is that
the federal government should use its expertise to perform more general policy
studies of U.S. energy markets, producing studies on the environmental impacts
of different fuels and the compatibility of increased infrastructure with energy
and climate goals; these studies could inform individual permit decisions from
state and federal decision-makers. Part VI concludes the Article.

II. THREE ENERGY MARKET REVOLUTIONS: RENEWABLE POWER,
NATURAL GAS, AND OIL
The United States has always been an energy superpower: through the first
half of the twentieth century it was responsible for over half of the world’s oil
production, powering the Allies through the two World Wars.2 Although the
United States became a net energy importer in 1953,3 it remained among the

2 Rob Bracken et al., The Oil Age: World Oil Production 1859-2050, PLACES &
SPACES (2006), http://scimaps.org/mapdetail/the_oil_age_world_oi_73 [https://perma.cc/X5
PF-PGP8]. See generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY,
AND POWER (1991) (explaining the origins of the oil and gas boom in early 20th century
Texas and the development of the United States as the world’s first energy superpower).
3 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 18 (2017),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf [https://perma.cc/BF5C-QB2T]
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world’s top three oil producers along with the U.S.S.R. and Saudi Arabia.4 But
in recent years, U.S. innovation has moved it to the forefront of energy
production across multiple categories: it is now the world’s largest producer of
wind power,5 petroleum (oil and other liquids),6 and natural gas.7 Cheaper
renewable power and shale oil and gas have transformed U.S. energy markets
and are creating a pressing need for new energy transport.

A. The Renewable Revolution
In the last ten years, the U.S.
power
sector
has
been
transformed by the falling cost
of renewable power sources like
solar and wind. Wind and solar
power, supported by state
policies and federal tax credits,
now produce electricity at costs
that are competitive with
conventional sources of power

[hereinafter EIA OUTLOOK 2017] (“The United States has been a net energy importer since
1953, but declining energy imports and growing energy exports make the United States a net
energy exporter by 2026 in the Reference case projection.”).
4 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2007 xxxiv (2007),
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038407.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YL8XZKU] (“From 1974 through 1991, the former U.S.S.R. was the world’s leading crude oil
producer. After 1991, Saudi Arabia was the top producer until 2006 when Russia’s
production exceeded Saudi Arabia’s for the first time. U.S. production peaked in 1970 but
still ranked third in 2007.”).
5 Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, U.S. Number One in the World in Wind
Energy Production (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.awea.org/MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx?
ItemNumber=8463 [https://perma.cc/T7SW-DCGR] (“Wind produced over 190 million
megawatt-hours (MWh) in the U.S. last year . . . . China is close behind the U.S. at 185.1
million MWh and followed by third-place Germany at 84.6 MWh. Although China has
nearly double the installed wind power capacity as the U.S., strong wind resources and
production-based U.S. policy have helped build some of the most productive wind farms in
the world.”).
6 Linda Doman, United States Remains the World’s Top Producer of Petroleum and
Natural Gas Hydrocarbons, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (June 7, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31532 [https://perma.cc/8J4E-JSXG]
(noting that although Russia and Saudi Arabia sometimes surpass U.S crude oil production,
the U.S. has a clear lead in “petroleum” production, which accounts for production of lease
condensate as well as crude oil).
7 Id.
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generation.8 Even without any subsidies, wind power is now on average the
cheapest source of new power across a windy triangle of the United States
extending from North Dakota to Illinois to the Texas panhandle.9 In the
meantime, there are large desert areas in California, Arizona, and Nevada where
solar is the cheapest power source.10 As a result, most investment in new
capacity for power production has been in renewable sources like wind and solar
power.11
This good news raises a question: if a zero-emission source of electricity,
with no fuel costs, is the cheapest source of power in wide swaths of the country,
why not simply transition to an all renewable economy? There are two
fundamental difficulties. First, the regions where renewable power and solar
power are the cheapest options tend to be the least populated portions of the
United States: wind is strongest on the lone prairie and sun is strongest in areas
that are literally desert.12 If solar and wind are going to power the U.S. grid, it
will take a massive build-out of power transmission to bring that power to the
urban centers where power is actually consumed.13 And that is exactly what

8 EIA OUTLOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 86; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED

COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 1 (2017), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_
generation.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEQ9-8CG7] [hereinafter EIA LEVELIZED 2017] (“For
technologies such as solar and wind generation that have no fuel costs and relatively small
variable O&M costs, LCOE changes in rough proportion to the estimated capital cost of
generation capacity.”). There are, however, important caveats. Id at 3 (noting, for example,
that it “includes the impacts of the Clean Power Plan (CPP), state-level renewable electricity
requirements as of November 2016, and an extension and phase-out of federal tax credits for
renewable generation”).
9 Joshua D. Rhodes et al., New U.S. Power Costs: By County, with Environmental
Externalities, in THE FULL COST OF ELECTRICITY, U. TEX. ENERGY INST. 11, 17 fig.8 (2016),
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin_FCe_LCOE_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3XE-PKZ8] (using figures, including the map shown above, to depict the
minimum cost technology for each county across the United States).
10 Id. at 17.
11 EIA OUTLOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 85.
12 See Rhodes et al., supra note 9, at 11, 17. See generally Ashley C. Brown & Jim
Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the ‘Public
Interest’ in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 706 (2010)
(discussing the difficulties associated with using renewable sources of energy in populous
areas).
13 This may lead to a further energy transport revolution in which direct current (DC)
transmission lines are used rather than traditional alternating current (AC) lines because DC
transmission is more efficient for long-distance one-way electricity transport. Alexandra B.
Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1111 & n.196 (2013) (“Today, new,
high-voltage DC (“HVDC”) lines are often proposed as the most efficient and economical
method of transporting wind power long distances.”).
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utilities are planning: they believe they will smash investment records by
investing over $22 billion dollars in power transport in 2017.14
Second, the power grid must constantly balance the power provided to the
grid with the power demanded by consumers—every light switched on, every
phone plugged in, every cycle of the dishwasher.15 If either too much or too
little power is supplied to the grid, electrical devices will fail in homes and
workplaces everywhere.16 Grid managers are accustomed to avoiding such
problems by ordering more or less power from power plants across the grid to
manage fluctuations in demand.17 This challenge becomes more difficult when
using power supplies that also fluctuate uncontrollably, and the wind and sun
only provide power when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining.
There are several ways to integrate more cheap and clean renewable power
into the grid. The most plausible options will require more capital investment in
energy transmission and each of these options will have to be pursued
simultaneously if the United States wants a timely transition toward renewable
sources. First, long-range inter-regional transmission can help smooth local
fluctuations in renewable power—when it is cloudy and still in one region, it
may be sunny and windy in another region that could be connected by
transmission.18 Second, renewable sources can be paired with natural gas power
plants that can easily ramp up and down to ensure that power supply matches
demand, but that will require a huge build-out in natural gas pipelines.19
Third, renewable sources can be paired with facilities that can store power.
At the moment, 98% of these facilities use what is known as “pumped hydro,”
where excess electricity can be used to pump water from a lower reservoir to a
higher reservoir and then can be released back to the lower reservoir to create

14 EDISON ELECTRIC INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS: AT A GLANCE v (2016),

http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Documents/Trans_Project_lowres_bookm
arked.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XLN-UL7J].
15 See EIA LEVELIZED 2017, supra note 8, at 2 (“Since load must be balanced on a
continuous basis, units whose output can be varied to follow demand (dispatchable
technologies) generally have more value to a system than less flexible units (nondispatchable technologies), or those whose operation is tied to the availability of an
intermittent resource.”).
16 See id.
17 Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581, 595–96
(2018); Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 293 & n.115 (2017).
18 Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 44–52 (2014); Herman K. Trabish, Why Aren’t Those Wind Turbines Turning?,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/whyarent-those-wind-turbines-turning#gs.GlGzFNk [https://perma.cc/5XX5-7YJS] (describing
why wind generators must sometimes be “curtailed”—producing no energy even when wind
is strongest—because of the lack of power transmission).
19 See infra Part II.B; James W. Coleman & Sarah Marie Jordaan, Clearing the Air:
How Canadian LNG Exports Could Help Meet World Greenhouse Gas Reduction Goals,
C.D. HOWE INST., E-BRIEF 2 (2016), https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/
attachments/research_papers/mixed/e-brief_244.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD94-4PGJ].
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electricity when it is needed.20 But these pumped hydro facilities are also limited
to certain locations: they are most economical where there is suitable terrain,
limited evaporation and wildlife, and ideally, pre-existing hydropower or, at
least, reservoirs.21 As a result, these facilities are, if anything, more
geographically constrained than solar and wind power.22 And transitioning to a
low carbon economy will require massive investments in new storage facilities
and transmission from storage locations to the urban grids that demand power.23
To support a move to pure renewable power, studies suggest that the United
States would need over 2,500 Gigawatts of power storage, more than twice the
country’s current generation capacity.24 Currently the United States has 22
Gigawatts of power storage capacity—less than 1% of what is needed.25 No one
has yet estimated the massive scale of transmission required to connect that
much pumped hydro, dispersed across the country, to power grids that need
electricity storage.
The power industry already attracts more capital investment than any other
U.S. industry.26 Just to maintain the current level of service, it will need another
20 John Roach, For Storing Electricity, Utilities Are Turning to Pumped Hydro, YALE

ENV’T 360 (Nov. 24, 2015), http://e360.yale.edu/features/for_storing_electricity_utilities_
are_turning_to_pumped_hydro [https://perma.cc/822F-HYZR] (“[P]umped storage
hydropower is still the only one [method of power storage] that is mature, reliable, proven,
and commercially available . . . .”). The next biggest sources of power storage are
compressed air energy storage, where air is pumped underground and then released when
power is needed, and thermal storage, where excess electricity is used to produce heat or
cold that can be stored in insulation and used when necessary. IMRE GYUK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY, GRID ENERGY STORAGE 11 (2013), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/09/
f18/Grid%20Energy%20Storage%20December%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4JATB35]. Battery storage is a distant fourth. Id.
21 Pumped Storage Provides Grid Reliability Even with Net Generation Loss, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (July 8, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayin
energy/detade.php?id=11991 [https://perma.cc/A3QW-BCF9] [hereinafter EIA, Pumped
Storage] (showing location of pumped hydro plants in the United States).
22 See id.
23 Other options for moving to a low carbon economy, such as nuclear power or carbon
capture, would also require massive capital investments. Edward S. Rubin et al., Cost and
Performance of Fossil Fuel Power Plants with CO₂ Capture and Storage, 35 ENERGY POL.
4444, 4444 (2007); Georg Woite, Capital Investment Costs of Nuclear Power Plants, 20
INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BULLETIN 11, 12–13 (1978), https://www.iaea.org/sites/
default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull20-1/20104781123.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4C5G-XDBQ].
24 Christopher T. M. Clack et al., Evaluation of a Proposal for Reliable Low-Cost Grid
Power with 100% Wind, Water, and Solar, 114 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6722, 6724
(2017), http://www.pnas.org/content/114/26/6722.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ATZ-6YGS]
(noting that a study suggesting that the United States could rely on 100% renewable power
“assumes a total of 2,604 GW of storage charging capacity, more than double the entire
current capacity of all power plants in the United States”).
25 EIA, Pumped Storage, supra note 21.
26 DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD 401 (2012) (“Electric power is a classically long-term business. A power
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trillion dollars of investment.27 Transitioning to a low-carbon economy will
require even more investment to transmit power from dispersed renewable
resources, integrate power storage, and provide natural gas transport and storage
to back-up these variable sources of power.

B. The Natural Gas Revolution
In the past decade, directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing have
transformed global natural gas markets. Fracking has unlocked increased
production in formations like the Marcellus Shale, which is centered in
Pennsylvania, and the Barnett Shale in Texas.28 And wells in formations that
are generally known for oil production, such as the Bakken Shale in North
Dakota and the Eagle Ford in Texas, are also producing more gas along with the
oil extracted, inevitably increasing U.S. gas production.29
Increased production of natural gas has crashed natural gas prices across
much of North America: prices for producers fell more than 80% from July 2008
to May 2012.30 Natural gas prices are especially subject to price swings because
it is so expensive to transport a gas.31 Solids like coal can be transported in
almost any container—even an open railroad car. Liquids like oil can also be
transported in many vessels, including trucks, rails, barges, and tankers. But gas
plant built today may be operating 60 to 70 years from now. It is also a big-ticket business—
in fact, it is the most capital-intensive major industry in the United States. Fully 10 percent
of all capital investment in the United States is embedded in the power plants, transmission
lines, substations, poles, and wires that altogether make up the power infrastructure.”).
27 Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review
for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 140–41 (2015) (“The U.S. electric grid
constitutes an $876 billion asset managed by over 3,000 utilities serving nearly 300 million
customers.”). Id. at 142 (“[I]n order to maintain even current levels of grid reliability, the
electric industry must make . . . investments in transmission and distribution alone of nearly
$900 billion.”).
28 See James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1357, 1364–65 (2014) [hereinafter Coleman, Importing]; Thomas W. Merrill & David
M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water
Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 153–54 (2013); Fenner L.
Stewart, When the Shale Gale Hit Ohio: The Failures of the Dormant Mineral Act, Its Heroic
Interpretations, and Grave Choices Facing the Supreme Court, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 435, 436–
38 (2015).
29 See Coleman, Importing, supra note 28, at 1366–67.
30 See id. at 1364; U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec.
12, 2018), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm [https://perma.cc/F3PX-CBML].
31 See James W. Coleman, The Shale ‘Revolution’ Is About Gas Prices & Oil
Production, ENERGY CENT. (July 17, 2014), http://theenergycollective.com/energylawprof/
432466/shale-revolution-about-gas-prices-oil-production [https://perma.cc/VAR3-EUTA]
[hereinafter Coleman, Shale] (“Increased production of natural gas has had a dramatic effect
on natural gas prices because natural gas is hard to transport. If you can’t send natural gas
by an existing pipeline to an existing market, your next best option may be to cool it into a
liquid at −162 °C, load the liquid onto a giant, insulated, quarter-billion dollar vessel and
ship it across the ocean, where it can be regasified and burned.”).
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can only be transported with expensive air-tight, and sometimes refrigerated
vessels.32 So if coal or oil is more expensive in one region than another,
companies can simply ship these fuels to the place where it is worth more until
prices equalize.33 On the other hand, when there is a local increase in gas
production, it must all be used locally even if there is little need to burn more
gas in the immediate area until transport can be built to carry it to markets where
gas is desperately needed.34 This is why natural gas prices around the world can
vary by orders of magnitude, whereas the price of oil, which is cheaper to
transport, differs only by percentage points across the globe.35
As a result, fracking and new gas production have opened up wide natural
gas price differentials around the world. Even markets in close proximity can
have very different gas prices if there is not enough transport capacity to serve
the demand in the high cost market: for example, while Pennsylvania and Texas
have the cheapest natural gas in the world, nearby markets in Massachusetts and
Mexico at times pay the world’s highest prices for natural gas.36
32 Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1018

n.68 (1992) (discussing economic peril for gas producers “where gas found cannot be sold
currently because a pipeline is unavailable and the gas cannot otherwise be marketed”);
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy
Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1518 n.169 (1981) (“Gas is not easily stored above
ground and can be transported only by pipeline. Moreover, gas pipelines require large capital
investments and can be justified only if the pipeline owner has secure sources of supply
under long-term gas purchase contracts.”); Nancy J. Forbis, Note, The Shut-In Royalty
Clause: Balancing the Interests of Lessors and Lessees, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1989)
(“Natural gas is difficult, if not impossible, to store outside a reservoir, and thus producers
must either transport gas to a pipeline as it is produced or retain it at the wellhead until they
can locate a willing purchaser.”).
33 See, e.g., Coleman, Shale, supra note 31.
34 Id.
35 Id. Renewable energy, of course, faces the same dilemma. Someone is always willing
to pay for electricity somewhere, but it is often too expensive to transport electricity from
wind-abundant regions to places where it is needed. So wind and solar farms often receive
very little for their electricity or even have to pay other parties to take it. Avery Thompson,
It’s So Windy in Britain That the Price of Electricity Went Negative, POPULAR MECHS. (June
8, 2017), https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/a26827/britain-price-ofelectricity-negative/ [https://perma.cc/CV7T-JNZD]; Cassie Werber, California Is Getting
So Much Power from Solar That Wholesale Electricity Prices Are Turning Negative,
QUARTZ (Apr. 8, 2017), https://qz.com/953614/california-produced-so-much-power-fromsolar-energy-this-spring-that-wholesale-electricity-prices-turned-negative/
[https://perma.cc/6RY3-NDZJ]. There are signs that the same dynamic will gradually impact
more and more regions as they add renewable power to the grid. A Regional First: New
Englanders Used Less Grid Electricity Midday Than While They Were Sleeping on April 21,
ISO NEW ENGLAND: ISO NEWSWIRE (May 3, 2018),
http://isonewswire.com/updates/2018/5/3/a-regional-first-new-englanders-used-less-gridelectricity-m.html [https://perma.cc/H9SE-GY5S].
36 EIA Staff, December Natural Gas Prices Spike in Boston, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14071
[https://perma.cc/Y9T4-VGBZ]; Adebola S. Kasumu et al., Country-Level Life Cycle
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These price differentials have set off a global race to connect new
production with high gas price markets in Asia and on the U.S. East Coast.37
The two main methods of moving natural gas—pipeline and ships carrying
liquefied natural gas—both require billions of dollars of capital investment.38

Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Liquefied Natural Gas Trade for Electricity
Generation, 52 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1735, 1739 (2018) (showing a spike in natural gas
prices in Mexico in mid-2013 from under $5 per million British Thermal Units (MMBTU)
to over $15 per MMBTU while U.S. Gulf Coast prices remain low); Naureen S. Malik, Cold
Snap Makes New England the World’s Priciest Gas Market, BLOOMBERG NEWS ENTER.
(Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-26/cold-snap-makesnew-england-the-world-s-priciest-market-for-gas [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal].
37 Coleman, Importing, supra note 28, at 1365–66; Merrill & Schizer, supra note 28, at
153–54. During the decade of peaking natural gas prices, the United States added over
20,000 miles of natural gas pipelines to connect expanding sources of natural gas production
with natural gas demand. James Tobin, Major Changes in Natural Gas Transportation
Capacity, 1998-2008, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 2008), http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas
/fwd/ngpipelinetc.html [https://perma.cc/4D3N-WHYG] (“More than 20,000 miles of new
natural gas transmission pipeline, representing more than 97 billion cubic feet per day of
capacity, were placed in service in the United States over the past 10 years.”). That building
boom has continued in the new era of natural gas abundance and is only likely to increase.
And there is every likelihood that the pace of pipeline building will continue as the nation
moves from coal to natural gas for electricity and heating oil to natural gas for heating.
Natural Gas Year-in-Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 10, 2012), https://www.eia.
gov/naturalgas/review/archive/2011/print_version.php [https://perma.cc/7ZU6-HG9S]. In
the decade of high gas prices, U.S. importers sought to build several new LNG import
facilities. Clifford Krauss, Exports of American Natural Gas May Fall Short of High Hopes,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/business/energyenvironment/exports-of-us-gas-may-fall-short-of-high-hopes.html [on file with Ohio State
Law Journal]. Now, with shale-gas driving U.S. prices below $3 per million BTUs, and
Asian shale-gas prices over $15, investors have submitted several applications to the
Department of Energy for new LNG export facilities that could ship to Asia. ERNST &
YOUNG GLOB. LTD., GLOBAL LNG: WILL NEW DEMAND AND NEW SUPPLY MEAN NEW
PRICING? 9 (2013) http://www.lngbunkering.org/sites/default/files/2013%20EY%20impact
%20of%20global%20supply%20patterens%20on%20LNG%20price.pdf [https://perma.cc/
43AE-J255]. Since 1981, the global LNG trade has doubled every eight years. INT’L GAS
UNION, WORLD LNG REPORT 2011 7 (2012), https://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/nodedocument-field_file/LNG%20Report%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS44-L8MU]; Knut
Einar Rosendahl & Eirik Lund Sagen, The Global Natural Gas Market: Will Transport Cost
Reductions Lead to Lower Prices?, 30 ENERGY J. 17, 17 (2009) (“Over the last decade the
costs of LNG have been significantly reduced, more producers have entered the gas market
in general and the LNG market in particular, and the trade between continents has
increased.”).
38 Coleman, Shale, supra note 31 (noting that because of the cost of shipping gas, “when
natural gas production rises, prices fall quickly because there is little use for the excess gas
in the markets it can reach. Prices will keep falling until 1) gas is so cheap that energy users
reliant on alternatives like coal and heating oil switch to gas, 2) gas is so cheap that it can be
profitably liquefied and sent overseas, or 3) gas is so cheap that it’s no longer worthwhile to
keep expanding production.”). The U.S. government has repeatedly said that until global
prices converge, global liquefied natural gas transport will continue to increase. JOHN CONTI,
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Interstate natural gas pipelines must be designed to avoid gas leakage, and
liquefaction facilities must cool natural gas most of the way to absolute zero
until the gas turns into a liquid that can be transported on quarter-billion dollar
refrigerated ships.39
Apart from the economic imperative to bring new U.S. gas production to
the markets where it is needed, increased natural gas transport has also been a
central part of U.S. environmental and geopolitical strategy.40 Compared to
other fossil fuels like oil and coal, gas burns extremely cleanly, which is why it
can even be burned inside a home.41 So liquefied natural gas exports could help
urban areas phase out dirtier fuels like heating oil, and help developing countries
address their air pollution problems by closing coal plants.42 Natural gas can
also complement intermittent sources like solar and wind power because, unlike
other power sources, it can ramp up to meet demand when those sources do not
provide enough power.43 Finally, better natural gas transport would mitigate one
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EFFECT OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC
ENERGY MARKETS 3 (2012), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/fe_lng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MGJ6-3TRS] (“Unlike the oil market, current natural gas markets are not
integrated globally. In today’s markets, natural gas prices span a range from $0.75 per
million British thermal units (MMBtu) in Saudi Arabia to $4 per MMBtu in the United States
and $16 per MMBtu in Asian markets that rely on LNG imports. Prices in European markets,
which reflect a mix of spot prices and contract prices with some indexation to oil, fall
between U.S [sic] and Asian prices.”).
39 Jacob Dweck et al., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy
Act of 2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 473 (2006)
(“Transporting natural gas very long distances from gas fields located in regions of the world
with little or nonexistent consuming markets across the oceans to large consuming markets
is made feasible by chilling the gas to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, at which point the
natural gas changes to a liquid state, reducing its volume to 1/600th that of vaporous natural
gas.”). Absolute zero is almost exactly minus 460˚F. Sarah Zielinski, Absolute Zero: Why Is
a Negative Number Called Absolute Zero?, SMITHSONIAN (Jan. 1, 2008),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/absolute-zero-13930448/ [https://perma.cc/32
6E-BFVM].
40 Agnia Grigas, Shale Shock: How to Use America's Energy Market as a Foreign
Policy Tool, NAT’L INT. (Mar. 19, 2017), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/shale-shockhow-use-americas-energy-market-foreign-policy-19823 [https://perma.cc/V7M2-WD7Q].
41 Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/environmental-impactsof-natural-gas#.WshoHdPwZjs [https://perma.cc/6QQV-NADH] (“Cleaner burning than
other fossil fuels, the combustion of natural gas produces negligible amounts of sulfur,
mercury, and particulates.”).
42 Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 19, at 2.
43 Id. (“Unlike solar and wind power, natural gas plants can be run at any time on
demand. Such plants even work well with solar and wind because they are easy to ramp up
or down to match power demand by supplementing the intermittent power these renewable
sources provide.”). Fast-ramping gas plants can also increase the value of renewable sources.
When solar and wind farms sell their power on a grid dominated by nuclear, hydro, or coal
power, they often fetch a low price because those sources will bid into the market at a very
low price rather than incur the expense of shutting down intermittently. See Michael
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negative side effect of the U.S. oil boom—oil from shale formations often is
accompanied by gas, and if there is no market for that gas, it is simply burned
off (known as “flaring”), wasting the fuel and emitting greenhouse gases.44

C. The Oil Revolution
Directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing have also transformed U.S. oil
production. U.S. oil production nearly doubled in seven years from under 5
million barrels per day in 2008, to nearly 10 million barrels per day in 2015.45
And, after a short downturn in 2016, the oil boom is back stronger than ever.
The United States is now projected to surpass its previous record oil production,
set in 1970, and is already producing more than 10 million barrels per day.46
The geographical distribution of North American oil production has also
shifted dramatically.47 Fracking has created three super-fields, each producing
over 1 million barrels of crude oil per day. The Permian Basin in western Texas
and southeastern New Mexico was the first to reach 1 million barrels in 2012
and has been rising steadily since that time, recently reaching 2.5 million barrels
per day.48 The Eagle Ford shale in southern Texas was next, hitting 1 million
barrels per day in 2013.49 The Bakken shale also reached that benchmark in
Shellenberger, Yes, Solar and Wind Really Do Increase Electricity Prices -- And for
Inherently Physical Reasons, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/michaelshellenberger/2018/04/25/yes-solar-and-wind-really-do-increase-electricity-pricesand-for-inherently-physical-reasons/#1e5d2fd17e84 [https://perma.cc/JQ8A-5WWQ]. By
contrast, a natural gas plant will gladly turn the grid over to renewable sources at somewhat
higher prices, because the gas plant can ramp down almost costlessly and will save money
on the natural gas it would otherwise need to purchase to serve demand. Id.
44 Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S.
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1009–15 (2015) (describing extensive
flaring in North Dakota as a result of lack of transport options to bring natural gas to markets
in need of gas).
45 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. FIELD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL (2019),
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=A
[https://perma.cc/3YQB-T5T6].
46 Jack Perrin & Emily Geary, U.S. Monthly Crude Oil Production Exceeds 10 Million
Barrels per Day, Highest Since 1970, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34772 [https://perma.cc/MB9Z-JM36].
47 Fenner L. Stewart & Allan Ingelson, Regulating Energy Innovation: US Responses
to Hydraulic Fracturing, Wastewater Injection and Induced Seismicity, 35 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES 109, 117–18 (2016) (identifying shale formation and corresponding twentyeight states of the Lower 48 where they are located).
48 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PERMIAN REGION DRILLING PRODUCTIVITY REPORT
(2018), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/archive/2018/12/pdf/permian.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3MG-FU8U].
49 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EAGLE FORD REGION DRILLING PRODUCTIVITY REPORT
(2018), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/pdf/eagleford.pdf [https://perma.cc/32U9JBP2]; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PERMIAN REGION DRILLING PRODUCTIVITY REPORT
(2017) https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/pdf/eagleford.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7ZN2UWT].
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2013.50 As recently as 2010 oil production in North Dakota had been negligible;
now it is the second-biggest oil producer.51
The pace of this development is astonishing. After just a few years of
widespread fracking, each of these fields is now producing more oil than is
produced in all the fields of oil powers like Libya.52 And Texas’s traditional
reputation as an oil capital may obscure the scale of the revolution that has
occurred there: in just four years it went from just over 1 million barrels per day
of production to over 3.5 million barrels per day. After more than fifty years of
development, oil superpowers like Kuwait and Nigeria produce 2.5 million
barrels per day.53 Texas added 2.5 million barrels a day on top of its existing
production in less than fifty months.54 It now produces more oil than Kuwait
and Libya combined.55
Canada has also contributed to the explosion of onshore oil production in
North America. As recently as 2000, the country produced less than 2 million
barrels per day of oil.56 But expanding production in Alberta’s oil sands, as well
50 U.S. ENERGY INFO, ADMIN., BAKKEN REGION DRILLING PRODUCTIVITY REPORT

(2018), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/pdf/bakken.pdf [hereinafter BAKKEN
PRODUCTIVITY REPORT]. The Bakken shale also extends into portions of Montana and
Saskatchewan. See Bakken Shale Maps, BAKKEN SHALE, https://bakkenshale.com/maps/
[https://permca.cc/2Z96-BMCA].
51 James Coleman (@energylawprof), Crude Oil Production by State, TWITTER (Mar.
29, 2018, 8:16 AM), https://twitter.com/EnergyLawProf/status/979376653573947392
[https://perma.cc/EXV3-UWR7] [hereinafter Crude Oil Production by State]; see also
BAKKEN PRODUCTIVITY REPORT, supra note 50 (providing more detailed data).
52 Salma El Wardany, Libya Oil Output at 4-Year High Loosens OPEC Grip on Supply,
BLOOMBERG NEWS ENTER. (July 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201707-02/libya-s-oil-production-said-to-exceed-1-million-barrels-a-day [on file with the Ohio
State Law Journal].
53 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, KUWAIT, ANNUAL,
https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category=711308&sdid=TOTAL.PAPRPKU.A
[https://perma.cc/24ZE-3ZUZ] [hereinafter CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, KUWAIT, ANNUAL];
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, NIGERIA, ANNUAL,
https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category=711308&sdid=TOTAL.PAPRPNI.A
[https://perma.cc/NJT7-8DGH].
54 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TEXAS FIELD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfptx1&f=a
[https://perma.cc/MBQ7-KLGK] [hereinafter TEXAS FIELD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL]; see
Crude Oil Production by State, supra note 51 (comparing Texas production with that in other
states).
55 Compare Crude Oil Production by State, supra note 51 (Texas produces over
4,000,000 barrels per day), with CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, KUWAIT, ANNUAL, supra note 53
(producing approximately 2,750,000 barrels per day), and U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, LIBYA, ANNUAL, https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category
=1039874&sdid=STEO.COPR_LY.A [https://perma.cc/M223-XJDC] (producing
approximately 897,000 barrels per day).
56 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, CANADA, ANNUAL
https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category=711309&sdid=TOTAL.PAPRPCN.A
[https://perma.cc/TS5M-WDW9].
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as fracking in Alberta and Saskatchewan, have doubled Canadian production,
which now stands at 4 million barrels per day, not including offshore production
in Eastern Canada.57
This onshore oil boom has scrambled oil transport markets, which for
decades were designed to carry oil into the center of North America. Historically
the best price for crude was obtained at refineries in the U.S. Midwest near
Chicago.58 And refineries in Texas took in oil from overseas to slake the thirst
of fuel markets in the South and Southeast.59 Now a flood of oil must travel the
other way, from Alberta, North Dakota, and Texas to parts of the country, and
parts of the world, that have not been part of the fracking boom.60
This new oil geography has led to a boom in pipeline proposals designed to
take oil from the center of the continent to the coasts, which is where most U.S.
refineries are located.61 While infamous pipelines like Keystone XL and Dakota
Access attracted controversy, numerous other pipelines and pipeline expansions
were approved and built, bringing oil south toward the coast.62 But these
proposals have not been able to keep up with the flood of crude: large volumes
57 CANADIAN ASS’N OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, CRUDE OIL FORECAST, MARKETS AND

TRANSPORTATION 4 (2017), http://www.oscaalberta.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CAPP2017-Crude-Oil-Forecast.pdf [https://perma.cc/94LG-3CYK] [hereinafter CANADIAN
CRUDE OIL FORECAST 2017].
58 Andrew Leach, The Shifting Flow of Oil, CANADIAN BUS. (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/blogs-and-comment/the-shifting-flow-of-oil/
[https://perma.cc/3F7R-PBRY] [hereinafter Leach, Shifting Flow]; Andrew Leach,
Explaining Canada’s Hurry to Build Pipelines in the U.S., MACLEANS (Nov. 21, 2011),
http://www.macleans.ca/economy/economicanalysis/explaining-canadas-hurry-to-buildpipelines-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/N8E7-AZ2Y] [hereinafter Leach, Explaining
Canada’s Hurry].
59 See Leach, Shifting Flow, supra note 58; Leach, Explaining Canada’s Hurry, supra
note 58.
60 See Leach, Explaining Canada’s Hurry, supra note 58.
61 CANADIAN ASS’N OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, CRUDE OIL FORECAST, MARKETS AND
TRANSPORTATION iii-iv (2015), http://0104.nccdn.net/1_5/06e/17d/2cd/Crude-Oil-Forecast-Markets-and-Transportation-Report-June-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXC5-7PKF]
[hereinafter CANADIAN CRUDE OIL FORECAST 2015]; see CANADIAN CRUDE OIL FORECAST
2017, supra note 57, at 23; Hannah Breul, Regional Refinery Trends Evolve to Accommodate
Increased Domestic Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19591 [https://perma.cc/P3FA-3RYH].
Once oil reaches the coast, it can also be shipped abroad if prices rise overseas. See Catherine
Ngai et al., Texas Flood: U.S. Oil Exports Pour into Markets Worldwide, REUTERS (Feb. 8,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oil-record-flows-analysis/texas-flood-u-soil-exports-pour-into-markets-worldwide-idUSKBN1FS0NP [https://perma.ccYYP7YHEQ].
62 See, e.g., Robert Tuttle, Keystone Left Behind as Canadian Oil Pours into the U.S.,
BLOOMBERG NEWS ENTER. (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20
14-11-14/keystone-left-behind-as-canadian-oil-pours-into-u-s- [on file with the Ohio State
Law Journal] (noting construction of Flanagan South and Seaway pipelines); CANADIAN
CRUDE OIL FORECAST 2015, supra note 61, at iv (noting five significant expansions of
Enbridge pipelines headed east and south during 2015).
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of oil are now traveling by rail as well.63 Transporting this oil by pipeline would
be safer than rail, which can lead to explosions when trains derail.64

III. ENERGY POLICY REVOLUTIONS: CHANGING PROCEDURES FOR
APPROVING ENERGY TRANSPORT PROJECTS
Recent years have seen major upheavals in the process for approving all
forms of energy transport. This has been driven by four important forces. First,
as energy issues have grown more contentious, the federal government has
pushed for an increased role in considering proposed interstate oil pipelines and
power transmission, which have traditionally been approved by the states.
Second, on the flip side, some states have asserted a right to block federallyapproved interstate gas pipelines. Third, environmental groups have
increasingly asked governments and courts to impose expanded consultation
requirements and environmental reviews on energy transport projects. Fourth,
land owners have asked federal and state governments to limit eminent domain
for power-lines and pipelines.
These four trends have come together most prominently in opposition to oil
pipeline proposals such as Keystone XL and the Dakota Access Pipeline. But
even if these moves were developed as a legal strategy to stop fossil fuels65 (or
63 Indeed, the ease of transporting oil by other means is one reason that production has
increased so dramatically—when local production of oil rises dramatically, it can just be
shipped abroad to places still in need of oil. James Coleman, The Shale ‘Revolution’ Is About
Gas Prices and Oil Production, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (July 17, 2014),
http://theenergycollective.com/energylawprof/432466/shale-revolution-about-gas-pricesoil-production [https://perma.cc/VAR3-EUTA]. Prices will not fall dramatically until world
demand is saturated. Id. In contrast, because natural gas is so hard to transport, local booms
in natural gas production often have a drastic impact on local gas prices. Id.
64 Crude-by-rail is particularly dangerous for the light and highly flammable crude oil
unlocked by hydraulic fracturing: in just one incident, a train carrying oil from new oil fields
in North Dakota derailed in the Canadian town of Lac Mégantic, killing forty-seven people
in a massive explosion. Grant Robertson, North Dakota’s Explosive Bakken Oil: The Story
Behind a Troubling Crude, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/north-dakotas-explosivebakken-oil-the-story-behind-a-troubling-crude/article16157981/
[https://perma.cc/359K6HJD]; U.S. STATE DEP’T, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ES12, ES-35 (2014), https://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/221135.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L6UN-T5P3] (estimating transport by rail instead of pipeline could cost oil
producers “up to $8” extra per barrel of oil transported and that denying the Keystone XL
pipeline “would result in an estimated 49 additional injuries and six additional
fatalities . . . on an annual basis” due to increased oil transport by rail); see also Klass &
Meinhardt, supra note 44, at 974–75 n.172 (discussing other destructive railway accidents
involving oil transport).
65 For a description of how delays to these pipelines impacted oil transport investment,
see James W. Coleman, Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies Are Transforming
Industry Investment Long Before Rules Can Be Tested in Court, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV.
497, 512–14 (2017).
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even make cleaner fuels look better by comparison), they will have a serious
impact on all energy transport projects if they are successful. Federalism,
environmental assessment, and the rights of indigenous peoples and land owners
all present cross-cutting issues that are equally applicable to power and fuel
transport. And there will always be challengers who object to new infrastructure
because of impacts on local communities, disagreements about the best future
for the electricity grid, and the environmental impact of energy transport. This
section demonstrates how these issues cut across modes of energy transport,
posing the greatest risk to cleaner sources of energy such as renewable power.
A. Federal Government’s Expanded Role in Interstate Oil and Power

Transmission
Approval of interstate powerlines and oil pipelines has historically been left
to the states crossed by these energy projects.66 That is, if a company wants to
build a powerline or pipeline from Kansas to Texas, it must get the approval of
Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma, which lies between the two states.
In theory, the federal government also has some authority over these
pipelines because they inevitably cross “navigable waters,” which include
navigable waters such as rivers as well as some wetlands and other aquatic
features that are not, in fact, navigable.67 The federal government must grant
Clean Water Act Section 404 permits for these crossings.68 But, in practice, the
federal government has left review of these projects to the states, preauthorizing water crossings by pipelines and power-lines.69 In 2012, it reissued
66 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 44, at 982–88, 1027–53 (noting varied approaches to
oil pipeline siting in different states and collecting state statutes). One prominent exception
is energy transport projects that, like Keystone XL, cross an international border—those have
historically required a presidential permit under Executive Orders 11423 (1968) and 13337
(2004). Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12–13, 17, 26 n.13
(D.D.C. 2013) (denying motion for preliminary injunction against domestic crude oil
pipeline because it, unlike Keystone XL is “an entirely domestic pipeline”).
67 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732, 759 (2006) (ruling by a four-Justice
plurality that this term only includes “relatively permanent” bodies of water, concurrence
from Justice Kennedy says this term, instead, refers to waters or wetlands with a “significant
nexus” with navigable waters); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 133 (1985) (finding the statue also covers wetlands adjacent to navigable waters).
68 See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2012); Riverside, 474 U.S. at 123. The Congress could also
pass new laws regulating pipelines and power-lines under its constitutional authority “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes” under the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Although this power is not unlimited, and may not extend to all water bodies, it certainly
extends to water crossings. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172–74 (reading “navigable waters”
in the Clean Water Act not to apply to isolated bodies of water to avoid “significant
constitutional questions” about whether Congress could regulate such bodies of water).
69 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NATIONWIDE PERMIT SUMMARY 12 (2012),
https://www.spk.usace.army.mil/Portals/12/documents/regulatory/nwp/2012_nwps/2012-
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a nationwide general permit that allows energy infrastructure to be built without
individualized environmental review.70 So in practice the federal government
has left review of interstate pipelines and powerlines to the states that these
pipelines cross.71
This equilibrium was upset when the U.S. government declared that it
would do a full review of the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline, which
already had approvals from the states that it would cross: North Dakota, South
Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois.72 In contrast, to the usual expedited process, the
pipeline underwent an in-depth environmental assessment and consultation
process, consuming more than a year and 1,200 pages, which ultimately
determined that the pipeline would have “no significant impact” on
environmental or cultural resources.73 This decision meant, however, that the
pipeline would not have to undergo a full environmental impact statement
process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which now
average over five years to complete.74
Nevertheless, in the waning days of the Obama Administration, the Army
Corps of Engineers announced it would do a full environmental impact
statement for the pipeline, announcing that the federal government would take
a wider role in approving interstate energy infrastructure as part of its

NWP-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WD7-NXLV] (making no mention of climate change in the
environmental analysis that accompanies domestic crude pipelines). President Obama even
specifically streamlined this already minimal process. Press Release, Office of the Press
Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum—Expediting Review of Pipeline Projects from Cushing,
Oklahoma, to Port Arthur, Texas, and Other Domestic Pipeline Infrastructure Projects (Mar.
22, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/22/presidentialmemorandum-expediting-review-pipeline-projects-cushing-okla [https://perma.cc/L8EQH3YF].
70 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, supra note 69.
71 On the other hand, the federal government has consistently said that it must approve
pipelines that would cross international borders, such as the Keystone XL pipeline proposal.
See Exec. Order No. 11,423, 3 C.F.R. § 742 (1966–1970) (designating the Secretary of State
as responsible for receiving and considering permits for facilities, including pipelines, that
cross U.S. borders); Exec. Order No. 13,337, 3 C.F.R. § 165 (2004) (providing special
instruction to the Secretary of State on how to treat facilities for the “exportation or
importation of petroleum, petroleum produces, coal, or other fuels”).
72 Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Sec’y of the Army, to the Commander
of the U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Proposed Dakota Access Pipeline Crossing at Lake Oahe,
North Dakota 3–4 (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/459011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QUB-AK5L].
73 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MITIGATED FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE PROJECT WILLIAMS, MORTON,
AND EMMONS COUNTIES, NORTH DAKOTA (2016), https://cdm16021.contentdm.oclc.org/
digital/collection/p16021coll7/id/2801 [https://perma.cc/4GFB-W3AL] (then select “Final
EA” on the right; then click the download button above it).
74 Dept. of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757–58 (2004) (describing how a
finding of no significant impact does not require any further Environmental Assessment or
Environmental Impact Statement). For length of environmental reviews, see infra Part V.C.
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responsibility to Indian tribes.75 This shift was particularly dramatic because the
federal government still insisted the pipeline would have “no significant impact”
on the environment.76
This new policy was reversed by the incoming Administration and is now
embroiled in court disputes.77 The district court reviewing the Army Corp’s
75 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR REGARDING STANDING
ROCK SIOUX TRIBE V. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-department-justice-department-army-anddepartment-interior-regarding-standing [https://perma.cc/26GW-MZXK] (“Furthermore
this case has highlighted the need for a serious discussion on whether there should be
nationwide reform with respect to considering tribes’ views on these types of infrastructure
projects.”); Updates and Frequently Asked Questions: The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s
Litigation on the Dakota Access Pipeline, EARTHJUSTICE (Nov. 1, 2018),
http://earthjustice.org/features/faq-standing-rock-litigation [https://perma.cc/V4QT-3HKC]
(interpreting the government’s joint statement as “call[ing] for a national review of the
government’s approach to Tribal consultation for major fossil fuel projects”). Just before the
end of the Obama Administration, in January 2017, the three departments issued a report on
their review of consultation with tribes on infrastructure decisions. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
DEP’T OF THE ARMY & DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, IMPROVING TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND
TRIBAL INVOLVEMENT IN FEDERAL INFRASTRUCTURE DECISIONS (2017) https://www.bia.gov
/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc2-060030.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE8X-YDDQ]. The
tribes’ recommendations focused mostly on oil pipelines rather than infrastructure in general.
See id. at 15, 52, 65 (“Clarify the need to conduct an EIS for crude oil pipeline construction
and operation. . . . Tribes noted that the most problematic projects reviewed under the NHPA
involve extractive industries (such as oil, natural gas and mining). . . . Tribes similarly
opposed the use of Nationwide Permits to authorize major infrastructure projects
(particularly oil pipelines), which Tribes did not believe sufficiently safeguarded treaty
rights.”). The departments, however, did not distinguish between different kinds of
infrastructure projects. See id. at 16–24.
76 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 24
(D.D.C. 2016); see also Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, supra note 72, at 1, 4 (“On July
25, 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) granted a permission to applicant
Dakota Access, L.L.C., under Section 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 408 (Section 408 permission), for a proposed crossing of Lake Oahe, a Corps project on
the Missouri River. . . . The Section 408 permission was accompanied by an Environmental
Assessment, as contemplated under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321–4335, and its implementing regulations. . . . The Environmental Assessment
included a finding that granting the Section 408 permission for the proposed crossing of Lake
Oahe did not constitute a major Federal action that would have significant environmental
impacts. . . . [T]his decision does not alter the Army’s position that the Corps’ prior reviews
and actions have comported with legal requirements.”); Ellen M. Gilmer, Obama Admin
Denies Final Easement for Pipeline, E&E NEWS (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060046601/ [https://perma.cc/F267-8HYW] (noting some denounced the decision
as political and urged then-President-elect Trump to reverse it upon assuming office).
77 Exhibit 1: Easement for Fuel Carrying Pipeline Right-Of-Way Located on Lake Oahe
Project, Morton and Emmons Counties, North Dakota, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1-16-cv-1534-JEB). This rereversal from the Army Corps was made in response to direction from the new
Administration. See Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the Sec’y of State, the
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decision ultimately determined that the lengthy environmental assessment
process had failed to adequately consider the possibility of oil spills and the
potential impact of the project on cultural resources.78 It remains to be seen
whether the courts or future administrations will continue to expand the federal
role in interstate pipeline approvals.79
At the same time that the federal government was seeking to layer federal
review on top of state reviews of interstate oil pipelines, it was seeking to
remove state review of certain power-line projects. Given the abundance of
wind power in the plains states, and the dearth of renewable power in the
populous U.S. Southeast, a company, Clean Line Energy Partners, proposed a
new power-line from Oklahoma, across Arkansas, to Tennessee. Arkansas,
however, saw little benefit in a new power-line crossing the state to help power
producers and consumers on either side, and rejected the power line. At this
point, two federal agencies stepped in—the Department of Energy and the
Southwestern Power Authority—and partnered with Clean Line Energy
Partners, preempting Arkansas’s rejection of the power-line. This move by the
federal government to alter the balance of power in energy federalism was also
challenged in court, but has since been abandoned.80
Secy of the Army, and the Secy of the Interior, Presidential Memorandum Regarding
Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-construction-keystone-xlpipeline/ [https://perma.cc/AM4B-3FR4]; see also Plaintiff Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s
Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1–2, Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1-16-cv1534-JEB) (arguing the President’s direction for the Army Corps of Engineers to “review
and approve” the permit was “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law”).
78 Standing Rock Sioux v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 147
(D.D.C. 2017); see also Ellen M. Gilmer, Pipeline’s Fate Uncertain After Big Legal Victory
for Tribes, E&E NEWS (June 15, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056071
[https://perma.cc/J4U6-B5PM] (discussing the decision, the pipeline’s uncertain future, and
how a “decision to shut off a pipeline for inadequate environmental review would be
unprecedented”).
79 There are some signs that courts may be willing to overturn the general federal policy
of minimal review for oil and power transport projects. A federal court in Louisiana recently
held that the Army Corps’s finding of no significant impact for an oil pipeline was invalid,
although the decision was subsequently enjoined by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Ellen M. Gilmer, Court Lifts Freeze on Bayou Bridge Project, E&E NEWS (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/03/16/stories/1060076547
[https://perma.cc/P7GK-NWUJ]. This could be seen as part of the general trend since the
New Deal of moving more areas of American law from state responsibility into the federal
domain. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & GRANT M. HAYDEN, AMERICAN LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 136–38 (3d ed. 2017).
80 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Downwind v. U.S. Dept. of
Energy, No. 3:16-cv-00207-JLH (E.D. Ark. filed Aug. 15, 2016) (challenging the
Department of Energy’s decision to approve the construction and operation of an electronic
transmission line on due process, statutory authority, sufficient rationale, and improper use
of eminent domain); Tom Kleckner, Arkansas Landowners Seek to Stop Plains & Eastern
Clean Line Project, RTO INSIDER (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.rtoinsider.com/arkansas-
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B. State Government’s Expanded Role in Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines
Natural gas pipelines are approved by the federal government, through the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and thus states have traditionally not
had a significant role in regulating these projects.81 But here too the balance of
power in energy federalism is under attack as states assert a right to block
federally-approved projects. Any significant construction project inevitably
requires numerous state and local construction permits: permits to bring in
heavy equipment, permits to cross streams, permits to close roads for
construction. Historically, a federal permit was generally enough to ensure that
these permits were granted but first Connecticut and now the State of New York
have decided that they have authority under the U.S. Clean Water Act Section
401 to deny a state Water Quality Certification to pipelines approved by the
federal government.82
In 2016, New York denied a Water Quality Certification to the Constitution
Pipeline, which was designed to transport natural gas from shale fields in
Pennsylvania to consumers in New York, and had been approved by the federal
government in 2014.83 In doing so, New York was following the example of
Connecticut, which in 2006 denied a water quality certification to the federallyapproved Islander East pipeline.84 New York argued that pipeline construction
would endanger New York’s water supplies85—a contention not supported by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.86 Pipeline backers quickly filed
suit, alleging that the state could not deny water quality permits to a federally
plains-eastern-clean-line-30539/ [https://perma.cc/48WN-3B3V]; Robert Walton, DOE
Terminates Partnership With Clean Line Energy Partners, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/doe-terminates-partnership-with-clean-line-energypartners/519995/ [https://perma.cc/MKGA-RHWH].
81 See Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717f(c)–(h).
82 See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 79 (2d Cir.
2006). Note that these permits are granted under the federal Clean Water Act, so they are not
simply preempted by the federal approval.
83 Letter from John Ferguson, Chief Permit Adm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, to Lynda Schubring, Envtl. Project Manager, Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC,
Water Quality Certification/Notice of Denial (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs
/administration_pdf/constitutionwc42016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC9L-C6CX]; Alexandra
B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation, 41
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 426–27 (2017) (discussing the New York Department of
Environmental Conservation’s decision in relation to other regulatory decisions).
84 Islander, 482 F.3d at 79; Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 141
(2d Cir. 2008).
85 Letter from John Ferguson to Lynda Schubring, supra note 83, at 14.
86 Order Issuing Certificates and Approving Abandonment, 149 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2014);
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT CONSTITUTION
PIPELINE AND WRIGHT INTERCONNECT PROJECTS ES-4–ES-5 (2014), https://www.ferc.gov
/industries/gas/enviro/eis/2014/10-24-14-eis.asp [https://perma.cc/5QKD-RQMM] (scroll to
the bottom of the page, then click “Constitution FEIS Vol 1 Environmental Analysis PDF”).

2019]

PIPELINES & POWER-LINES

285

approved pipeline.87 The Second Circuit rejected this lawsuit, holding that New
York had acted reasonably.88 The court, however, stated that the company could
file suit in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals if it believed that New York had
waived its authority to deny the pipeline by taking so long to deny the
certificate.89
Emboldened by its victory in the Second Circuit, in 2017 the state denied a
Water Quality Certification to the Valley Lateral Pipeline proposal, an eightmile long pipeline also designed to transport natural gas from Pennsylvania to
New York.90 This short interstate pipeline had been approved by FERC in
2016.91 This time, New York did not rely on water quality arguments—instead
it premised its decision on the argument that FERC had not done enough to
assess how the pipeline would lead to more combustion of natural gas from users
at the end of the pipeline.92 This time, however, FERC acted, ruling that New
York had taken too long to issue this denial and had thus waived its authority to
deny the pipeline a Water Quality Certification.93 Barring intervention from
Congress, the result of lawsuits filed in both these cases will likely determine
the balance of power in natural gas transport federalism.

C. The Push for Expanded Environmental Reviews for Energy
Transport Projects
In June 2013, President Obama announced a new standard for the Keystone
XL pipeline, which had been proposed in 2008 to carry oil from Alberta to the
United States: he would only approve the project if it would not increase oil

87 Constitution Pipeline Co. v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 868 F.3d 87, 90 (2d

Cir. 2017); Unopposed Motion of Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.,
Interstate Nat. Gas Ass’n of Am., American Gas Ass’n, Am. Petroleum Inst., Am. Chemistry
Council, Nat. Gas Supply Ass’n, Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n, & Process Gas Consumers
Group for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, Constitution Pipeline v.
N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation 868 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1568); Complaint,
Constitution Pipeline v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 868 F.3d 87 (2017) (No. 1:16cv-00568-NAM-DJS).
88 Constitution Pipeline Co,, 868 F.3d at 91.
89 Id. at 103.
90 Letter from Thomas Berkman, Deputy Comm’r & Gen. Counsel, N.Y. State Dep’t
of Envtl. Conservation, to Georgia Carter, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Millennium
Pipeline Co., & John Zimmer, Mkt. Dir., TRC Envtl. Corp., Valley Lateral Project Notice of
Decision 2 (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/permits_ej_operations_pdf/valley
decltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF7Q-VV7A].
91 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Issuing Certificate, 157 FERC ¶ 61,096
(2016).
92 Letter from Thomas Berkman to Georgia Carter & John Zimmer, supra note 90, at
2.
93 Declaratory Order Finding Waiver Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 160
FERC ¶ 61,065 (2017).
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production (and thus greenhouse gas emissions) in Canada.94 Ultimately, the
U.S. State Department, which reviewed the international project, determined
that the pipeline probably would not increase oil production in Canada, but it
rejected the pipeline anyway in November 2015 because, it said, the pipeline
would be “perceived” to increase greenhouse gas emissions.95 Environmental
groups’ success in holding up the Keystone XL project for almost a decade has
led to wider efforts to establish a “climate test” for energy transport projects that
would: (a) quantify upstream and downstream emissions aided by pipelines and
power transmission and (b) reject projects that would significantly increase
those emissions.96
Environmental groups are also pushing the federal government to expand
environmental reviews of new gas transport—both liquefied natural gas
facilities and interstate pipelines—to consider how those transport facilities will
encourage natural gas production and consumption.97 The U.S. government has
thus far generally declined to consider how new pipelines and liquefied natural
gas facilities will affect natural gas production and consumption.98 The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has approved eleven of fourteen
proposed liquefaction facilities and 154 pipeline applications since 2009.99 Yet
94 James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental
Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 122 (2018)
[hereinafter Coleman, Beyond].
95 Id.
96 Id. at 123–34.
97 See Aaron Flyer, Note, FERC Compliance Under NEPA: FERC’s Obligation to
Fully Evaluate Upstream and Downstream Environmental Impacts Associated with Siting
Natural Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals, 27 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 301,
301 (2015) (arguing that FERC must consider upstream and downstream impacts in natural
gas pipeline and liquefied natural gas facility approvals); see also Amy Harder, Are NaturalGas Exports the Next Keystone?, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/wash
wire/2014/03/18/are-natural-gas-exports-next-keystone/ [https://perma.cc/VV6T-QNM8]
(discussing environmentalist opposition to expanded use of natural gas).
98 See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION PROJECT
MODIFICATION 66–67 (Apr. 2013), https://www.cheniere.com/terminals/sabine-pass/trains1-6/documentation/ [https://perma.cc/2M6K-BVYT] (assessing potential climate change
impacts and emissions increases without reference to resulting changes in production and
consumption); FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR
THE SABINE PASS
LIQUEFACTION PROJECT 2-99 to 2-100 (Dec. 2011),
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EA-1845-FEA-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/97UN-3A2Q]
(admitting that, currently, there is no standard to determine how incremental contributions
would translate into physical effects on the environment). FERC has exclusive authority to
approve or deny siting, construction, and operation of liquefied natural gas facilities. 15
U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (“The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to approve
or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an LNG
terminal.”).
99 The Department of Energy has approved eighteen of these projects and is reviewing
thirty-eight more. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SUMMARY OF LNG EXPORT APPLICATIONS (Mar.
2016) http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/03/f30/Summary%20of%20LNG%20Export
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FERC has resisted calls to consider the environmental impact of increased
natural gas production enabled by these new transport facilities.100 Under the
Obama administration, this led to increasingly high profile interagency conflicts
with the Environmental Protection Agency, which then believed that FERC
should provide full reviews of the upstream and downstream impacts of natural
gas projects.101 And in two recent cases, the D.C. Circuit reached opposite
decisions on whether FERC must consider the downstream impacts of
approving natural gas pipelines or liquefied natural gas facilities.102
It remains to be seen whether environmental groups will have more luck
with the courts, but on February 3, 2017, an outgoing commissioner of FERC,
Norman Bay, effectively endorsed these outside arguments for wider
environmental assessments.103 This argument came in a separate statement to
an otherwise uncontroversial pipeline approval.104 Commissioner Bay
continued to insist that NEPA does not require FERC to assess upstream and
downstream emissions from gas pipelines, noting that “FERC has no authority
%20Applications.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE39-FCVQ].
100 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Sierra Club v.
FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and
Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 137 (2017) (“FERC has consistently maintained that it has no obligation
to consider greenhouse emissions or any other environmental effects associated with
upstream and downstream activities in the natural gas production and supply chain.”). In one
older case, FERC did consider the downstream impact of increased natural gas use,
concluding that it could be controlled by ensuring transport of low sulfur natural gas for
combustion. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 1085, 1089–90 (9th Cir.
2010).
101 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Letter on Final Environmental Impact Statement for
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC—Leach Xpress Project, and Columbia Gulf Transmission
LLC—Ryan Xpress Expansion Project to U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Oct.
11, 2016) [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal] (stating that FERC’s environmental
review “perpetuates the significant omission” by not considering downstream impact and so
“[w]e request . . . a headquarters level meeting with us to seek a definitive resolution to this
matter before you [approve the pipelines] and so that you do not continue to take this
approach in additional NEPA documents”); U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Letter on
Comments on the Draft Guidance Manual for Environmental Report Preparation for
Applications Under the Natural Gas Act to U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Jan. 19, 2016) [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal] (stating that FERC’s environmental
reviews of liquefied natural gas terminals must add assessment of “emissions associated with
the production, transport, and combustion of the natural gas”). FERC’s position has generally
been supported by the other infrastructure and production approving agencies, such as the
Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management. BUREAU OF
OCEAN & ENERGY MGMT., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM:
2012-2017, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 8–37 (July 2012)
(rejecting consideration of upstream and downstream impacts for oil leases).
102 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Sierra Club
v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
103 Order Granting Abandonment and Issuing Certificates, 158 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2017).
104 Id.
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to regulate the production of natural gas [because] in general, that authority
resides with the states.”105 Nevertheless, “in light of the heightened public
interest and in the interests of good government,” Commissioner Bay said FERC
should begin studying the impacts of increased upstream emissions and the
downstream impact of natural gas.106

D. Objections to Eminent Domain for Energy Transport
A new front has opened in the energy transport battles, with several lawsuits
alleging that private companies should not be allowed to use eminent domain to
acquire easements for their projects.107 Eminent domain allows purchase of
easements from landowners at fair market value if a deal cannot be reached by
negotiation.108 It is particularly crucial for linear infrastructure such as roads,
pipelines, and power-lines because, otherwise, each landowner along the
proposed route can, in theory, hold out for a higher price to try to capture the
entire economic value of the project.109
These unresolved lawsuits have been filed in multiple federal and state
courts and allege that, under state and federal constitutions, energy transport
companies may not use eminent domain.110 They rely on multiple theories.
Some argue that private companies may not use eminent domain without a
particularly strong government showing of why those companies are operating
in the public interest.111 Some argue that foreign corporations should not be
allowed to use eminent domain.112 Some scholars argue that the federal

105 Id.
106 Id. These arguments have been echoed more recently by commissioner Richard

Glick, who believes that FERC is required to consider these upstream and downstream
greenhouse gas emissions. Order Granting Authorizations Under Sections 3 and 7 of the
Natural Gas Act, 166 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2019).
107 Brief of Amicus Curiae Niskanen Center at 9, Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 170423 (Iowa July 12, 2017); Complaint at 2, Berkley v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, L.L.C.,
2017 WL 6327829 (W.D. Va. 2017) (No. 7:17-CV-00357), aff’d, 896 F.3d 624 (4th Cir.
2018) [hereinafter Berkley Complaint]; Complaint to Vacate the FEIS for Injunctive Relief
and for Declaratory Relief at 7, Urban v. FERC, 2017 WL 6461823, at *1 (N.D. Ohio 2017)
(No. 5:17-cv-01005) [hereinafter Urban Complaint].
108 Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Essay, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1704, 1729 (2007).
109 Id. at 1710 (noting that pipelines are among the “Quintessential Public Projects”
because “often there may be only one feasible route” and “persons owning land along the
designated path are tempted to hold out for a high price in excess of the land’s opportunity
cost”).
110 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Downwind, L.L.C. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, 2018 WL 3641027 (E.D. Ark. 2017) (No. 3:16-CV-00207), vacated, 2018
WL 3648283, at *1 (8th Cir. 2018); Kleckner, supra note 80.
111 Berkley Complaint, supra note 107, at 24.
112 Urban Complaint, supra note 107, at 38.
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government simply was never intended to have the power of eminent domain.113
And some suggest that the case could be a vehicle for overturning the Supreme
Court’s controversial decision authorizing eminent domain on behalf of private
companies in Kelo v. City of New London.114
If successful, these lawsuits would force energy transport companies to try
to somehow piece together continuous easement routes from willing
landowners—any route could be foiled by a single hold out landowner.115 Thus,
they pose an existential threat to pipelines and power-lines.116

E. Cross-Cutting Energy Transport Law & Markets Require
Simultaneous Focus on Both Pipelines and Power-Lines
The highest profile energy transport battles have been for oil pipelines—
particularly the Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipelines—and, to a lesser
extent, natural gas pipelines, such as the Constitution Pipeline.117
Environmental advocates looking to stop pipelines have advocated for each of
the changes suggested above: overlapping federal and state reviews, expanded
environmental assessments, and restricted use of eminent domain.118 But
focusing too intently on oil pipelines can obscure the ways that these changes to
the approval process will also affect the other energy transport projects that the
United States needs to move toward a cleaner energy transport system.119 First,
each of these procedures may have a serious impact on approving new power
transmission. Second, aligning energy transport procedures could enable a
transition to cleaner energy because the current system is stacked in favor of
fossil fuel transport.
Each of the new hurdles advocated for oil pipelines poses a serious risk of
tripping up power-line projects as well. For example, a new federal commitment
113 See, e.g., William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE
L.J. 1738, 1738 (2013).
114 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Ellen M. Gilmer, Burgeoning
Legal Movement Pits Landowners Against Pipelines, E&E NEWS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060060443 [https://perma.cc/9EJE-SHZH] (“‘[I]t’s
possible that they might rethink parts of Kelo or maybe even overrule it.’” (quoting Professor
Ilya Somin)).
115 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75–
77 (1986).
116 For a comprehensive analysis of challenges to the use of eminent domain for pipelines
and power lines see James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain,
104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3348630.
117 Brigham A. McCown, Are New Pipeline Infrastructure Projects Doomed?, FORBES
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brighammccown/2018/04/04/are-newpipeline-infrastructure-projects-doomed/#81d99fd52b0a [https://perma.cc/3SM5-3HTT].
118 See supra Parts III.B–D.
119 And, of course, policymakers should be wary of adopting procedural suggestions
from groups whose substantive goals are to prevent any future approvals. Similarly, it would
be a mistake to let anti-wind power groups set the procedure for approval of wind turbines.
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to do full environmental and cultural review of interstate energy transport
projects, like the Dakota Access pipeline, would also require federal review of
interstate power transmission projects. So power-lines and oil pipelines would
both be subjected to two levels of review, requiring approvals from all state
regulators as well as the federal government. And decisions to limit the use of
eminent domain by private companies would impact power transmission as
well. In fact, the impact would likely be more severe because landowners have
traditionally been warier of granting easements for power lines than pipelines,
because pipelines, once buried in the ground, are invisible.120
Similarly, if upstream and downstream reviews gain traction in the courts,
it may increase uncertainty for power-line proposals as well. Of course, powerlines for renewable power transmission have many beneficial downstream
impacts, such as reducing emissions from fossil fuel plants.121 Indeed, FERC
has mandated that when states make transmission decisions they must consider
how their decisions will impact the ability of neighboring states to meet their
renewable targets.122
But there is no reason to think that electric transmission will be uniquely
immune from the uncertainties and delay caused by expanded and uncertain
environmental assessments. First of all, power transmission has historically
attracted more opposition than oil and gas pipelines because transmission is
above the ground, leaving a permanent eyesore.123 Second, the renewable
projects themselves often attract local opposition driven by the effects of large
solar and wind facilities on sensitive species, local land-use, and aesthetic

120 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 44, at 949.
121 Coleman, Importing, supra note 28, at 1378 (“For example, a transmission line from

in-state windmills to out-of-state consumers could also provide those consumers with cleaner
air if it displaced local coal power.”) (omitting internal references). And FERC has told states
it must consider these benefits in setting transmission policy. Transmission Planning and
Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶
61,051; see Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable
Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1692 n.45 (2012); Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of
Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 245–46 (2012) (exploring disparity between electricity
generation siting, which nominally remains in state control, and siting regimes governing
electricity and natural gas transmission).
122 Coleman, Importing, supra note 28, at 1363.
123 Lita Furby et al., Public Perceptions of Electric Power Transmission Lines, 8 J.
ENVTL. PSYCH. 19, 20 (1988) (“Transmission lines currently represent a problem area in the
electric power system: they require considerable land for their corridors, and the use of that
land for transmission lines may conflict with other land use practices or plans; they cause
noise . . . they are perceived to cause health problems and safety risks for both animals and
humans. As a result, high-voltage transmission line have recently met a very significant
amount of public opposition. . . . Opposition to transmission line siting and construction has
sometimes caused enormous costs to the utilities, through long delays in gaining regulatory
approval, litigation fees, and occasionally even vandalism.”).
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values.124 These opponents of wind and solar projects will use the same tactics
employed in pipeline debates: even a project that has received site approvals
will never be built if it cannot connect to centers of demand. With an expanded
environmental impact assessment, the transmission approval process will
provide another opportunity to re-litigate familiar disputes that wind turbines
endanger bird populations and damage scenic vistas or that solar farms have
impacts on water use, land use, and endangered species.
Transmission opponents can and will add arguments that all the downstream
economic activity that is served by electricity has negative impacts on the
environment or that the power transmission, which is open to all users, will be
diverted to serve fossil fuel power plants.125 And the arguments for considering
upstream and downstream consequences of electricity transmission are, if
anything, more reasonable than the same case for oil pipelines: oil can go by
rail, ship, or pipeline, but electric power can only go by transmission lines. Thus,
renewable power is, if anything, more vulnerable than oil pipelines to delay-byenvironmental-review tactics. And so it has proved. When investors proposed
the “Northern Pass” power line to take hydropower from Canada to
Massachusetts, opponents objected that helping Canadian hydropower
endangered fish populations in Canada.126 This strategy was ultimately
successful when New Hampshire rejected the power-line in February 2018.127

124 Patrick Devine-Wright, Reconsidering Public Attitudes and Public Acceptance of
Renewable Energy Technologies: A Critical Review 3 (Economic & Social Research
Council, Working Paper No. 1.4, 2007), http://geography.exeter.ac.uk/beyond_nimbyism/
deliverables/bn_wp1_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/95H7-VF76] (discussing “widespread local
opposition towards renewable energy developments, particularly wind and biomass”). For
example, California’s largest county recently banned new large solar projects because of
concerns that they would use too much land. Sammy Roth, California’s San Bernardino
County Slams the Brakes on Big Solar Projects, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-san-bernardino-solar-renewable-energy-20190228story.html [https://perma.cc/J4KU-BSBW].
125 Adam Orford, Power to the People: Primer on NEPA and Transmission Lines, 29
NAT. GAS & ELECTRICITY 16, 21 (2013) (“Perhaps most commonly, today’s transmission
opponents may argue that the agency should review and disclose the impacts of induced
energy generation as an ‘indirect effect.’ This might include greenhouse gas emissions if the
line is expected to induce, for example, new fossil generation . . . .”).
126 David Brooks, What Does the Quick Approval of a Vermont Power Line Say About
Northern Pass?, CONCORD MONITOR (Jan. 8, 2016), https://content.sierraclub.org/grassroot
snetwork/team-news/2016/01/what-does-quick-approval-vermont-power-line-say-aboutnorthern-pass [https://perma.cc/38PL-8G93] (noting that environmental groups oppose
transmission to bring hydropower into New England because “reservoirs displaced native
peoples and swamped ecosystems covering hundreds of square miles, including an infamous
1984 drowning of some 10,000 caribou during a water release from a dam”).
127 Michael Cousineau, Northern Pass ‘Shocked and Outraged’ by Application Denial,
N.H. UNION LEADER (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.windaction.org/posts/47787-northern-passshocked-and-outraged-by-application-denial#.XDETqs9KjOQ [https://perma.cc/J9NL7XH5].
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Similarly, eminent domain arguments against oil pipelines are being used
effectively against power lines for renewables as well.128 Resisting eminent
domain was another key strategy of the successful opposition to the Northern
Pass power-line.129 And in Missouri, opponents have been able to repeatedly
delay construction of a power-line designed to carry wind-energy to the
Midwest.130 Thus, while oil pipelines grab the national headlines, power-lines
across the country are being held up using the same legal arguments.
Finally, focusing on energy transport as a whole, aligning energy transport
procedures could be a very effective means of encouraging a transition to a
cleaner energy system because the combination of market realities and current
procedures favor fossil fuels. The irony of focusing on oil pipeline transport is
that it is the least important link in the energy transport chain: whether or not oil
pipelines are built, oil will typically get to market because oil can be easily
moved by rail, barge, or truck. Natural gas and electricity, by contrast, can only
be moved with large-scale projects, such as pipelines, liquefaction facilities, and
power lines.131 So if new procedures raise the cost of power lines and gas
pipelines, that will raise the cost of moving to a system that relies more on gas
and renewable power and less on easily transportable commodities such as oil
and coal.
Furthermore, as between natural gas and power, current procedures are
more favorable to gas transport because, New York notwithstanding, interstate
gas pipelines generally only need a single federal permit.132 By contrast,
interstate power lines must receive a permit from each state they cross. Utilities
must often consider whether to burn more natural gas near its source and
transmit power where it is needed or, in the alternative, to transport the natural
gas to where power is needed and burn it locally. Under the current divided
regulatory system, it is easier to get approval for an interstate gas pipeline than
an interstate power line, so utilities tend to transport the gas. But to move to a
renewable energy future, it would make more sense to build an interstate power
line that could be used to transport power from all sources: not just gas power
plants, but also new wind turbines and solar panels. Thus, our divided system
for approving energy transport actively pushes companies into environmentally
counter-productive investments. Proponents of a cleaner energy system have

128 Eric Dundon, Grain Belt Express Denied a Third Time, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB.
(Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20170816/grain-belt-expressdenied-third-time [https://perma.cc/5LT5-LG5Q].
129 Amanda Loder, Why Eminent Domain Bills Are Center Stage in Northern Pass
Controversy, NPR: STATEIMPACT N.H. (Jan. 18, 2012), https://stateimpact.npr.org/newhampshire/2012/01/18/why-eminent-domain-bills-are-center-stage-in-northern-passcontroversy/ [https://perma.cc/9L4B-Y5PE].
130 Dundon, supra note 128.
131 Dweck et al., supra note 39, at 473; Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 44, at 949.
132 See PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43138, INTERSTATE NATURAL
GAS PIPELINES: PROCESS AND TIMING OF FERC PERMIT APPLICATION REVIEW 5–6 (2015).
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more to gain from considering energy transport methods together and aligning
them, rather than by attacking the system piece-meal.

IV. HOW POLICY UNCERTAINTY IMPACTS INVESTMENT IN ENERGY
TRANSPORT
Investors in energy transport projects demand a rate of return that
compensates them for both the cost of the project and the danger that the project
will be delayed or canceled.133 As uncertainty increases due to expanded
reviews of these projects, investors will charge more to transport fuel and
electricity. Thus, energy consumers and producers will end up paying the costs
imposed by expanded reviews.134 And each of these trends is exacerbated in
restructured or “deregulated” markets where investors have no guarantee of
getting their money back.135
Given their regulatory complexity, companies developing interstate energy
projects already demand higher rates of return than they would receive for a
typical intrastate project.136 As states and the federal government add further
overlapping reviews, as environmental assessments are expanded, and as more
landowners challenge the use of eminent domain for energy transport projects,
investors will demand even higher rate of returns.
Higher rates of return will raise the cost consumers pay to achieve the
promise of an energy transition enabled by affordable new production of wind
and gas power.137 One consistent theme of literature on the cost of transitioning

133 See Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Capital Investment Strategies Under Uncertain
Regulation, 24 RAND J. ECON. 591, 591–92 (1993).
134 This is another way that media focus on individual pipeline controversies sometimes
misses the tensions driving energy policy. In the moment of transition, expanding review
often has the most tangible effect on the energy company whose project is delayed. Yet after
reviews have been expanded that is simply one more cost that energy companies will build
into the structure of their project.
135 Jay Apt et al., Promoting Low-Carbon Electricity Production, 23 ISSUES SCI. &
TECH. 37, 40 (2007) (“Profits are based on a set rate of return on capital, so more investment
means more profit. When the PUC approves such investments, utilities find that they can
borrow capital at reasonable rates, since the lenders correctly perceive that they face low risk
because the rate of return is guaranteed and the utility faces no competition within its service
territory. On the other hand, investors lending funds to competitive power producers face
uncertain returns and so lend at much higher rates. Not surprisingly, the majority of utilities
contemplating investments in large low-carbon plants are in regulated states, where they are
attempting to secure access to capital by partnering with their public utility commissions to
build such facilities.”).
136 Phil Mckenna, Pipeline Payday: How Builders Win Big, Whether More Gas Is
Needed or Not, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 3, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news
/02082017/natural-gas-pipeline-boom-corporate-profit-bubble-limited-demand-climateemissions [https://perma.cc/HMJ2-EU3S].
137 Teisberg, supra note 133, at 591; Biao Yang et al., Management of Uncertainty
Through Postponement, 42 INT’L J. PROD. RES. 1049 (2004).
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to these power sources is that it would be minimized by creating regulatory
certainty.138
Apart from making energy transport more expensive, on the margin,
expanded reviews will also make some energy transport projects not worth
pursuing. This too has costs. There are the economic costs to consumers who
are unable to purchase cheaper power and fuel and to the producers who cannot
serve them. But there are other costs.
There are environmental costs: unable to access cheaper and cleaner sources
like wind power and natural gas, power producers are stuck with older, dirtier
sources like oil and coal. For example, there are not enough gas pipelines to
New England to serve all of its heating and power needs in severe cold
weather.139 Although Pennsylvania is flooded with some of the cheapest gas in
the world, New England’s inadequate pipeline access meant it had the most
expensive natural gas in the world during the December 2017 cold snap.140 As
a result, power producers switched to the very dirtiest sources of power, coal
and oil, leaving New England with high power prices and polluted air.141
And there are costs for our nation’s energy security as well. In late January
2018, New England was forced to import liquefied natural gas from Russia to

138 OECD,

OECD BUSINESS AND FINANCE OUTLOOK 2016 144 (2016)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264257573-en [https://perma.cc/6BWP-MESS] (“Future
regulatory uncertainty makes it difficult for investors to formulate risk and return
expectations, causing hesitation and preventing capital inflows.”). Id. at 149 (noting that key
cost drivers include “The level of uncertainty, especially within broader enabling conditions,
and attractiveness of domestic policy frameworks: projects may face significant speculative
risks that are difficult for the private sector to quantify and mitigate, linked notably to
unstable and unpredictable legal and regulatory frameworks, high political risk and
construction risk.”); Frank Maarten Jan Venmans, The Effect of Allocation Above Emissions
and Price Uncertainty on Abatement Investments Under the EU ETS, 126 J. CLEANER
PRODUCTION 595, 595 (2016) (“[H]igh levels of uncertainty, creating a risk of offshoring
even when companies innovate, creates an option value to postpone abatement
investments.”); Apt et al., supra note135, at 39 (“[T]he timing and stringency of pollution
constraints remain uncertain. In this climate, companies will likely continue to build
conventional high-carbon-emissions plants, because they are cheaper. Indeed, uncertainty
may encourage utilities to rush now to build conventional plants in the hope that they will
be grandfathered under any new regulations, which would increase total costs by imposing
more stringent emission constraints for plants built later.”). See generally Peter S. Reinelt &
David W. Keith, Carbon Capture Retrofits and the Cost of Regulatory Uncertainty, 28
ENERGY J. 101, 118 (2007) (modeling indicates that regulatory uncertainty may increase the
cost of transitioning to cleaner energy sources by as much as 61%); William Blyth et al.,
Investment Risks Under Uncertain Climate Change Policy, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 5766, 5766
(2007).
139 Jim Polson & Naureen S. Malik, Oil Tops Gas in New England Power Mix as
Temperatures
Plummet,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
ENTER.
(Dec.
28,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-28/oil-tops-gas-in-new-englandpower-mix-as-temperatures-plummet [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal].
140 Id.
141 Id.
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supplement its poor pipeline access.142 The gas came from a company
sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department but was available for use in the
United States because it had been first purchased by French intermediaries.143
Thus, while U.S. producers were forced to sell their natural gas at the midcontinent’s bargain prices, sanctioned Russian companies received a premium
price from gas-starved New England consumers.

V. PRINCIPLES TO ENABLE THE ENERGY FUTURE
To attract investment in a new energy economy, the United States will need
procedures that can accommodate increased interest in energy transport
decisions while, at the same time, providing certainty to energy transport
investors. This section suggests four reforms that could accomplish these twin
goals. First, energy transport approvals should invite wider consultation with
affected parties while, at the same time, ultimately placing decision-making
authority in one level of government. Second, if approval processes are to be
reformed, that reform should generally be prospective only, not impacting
projects already in the review pipeline. Third, further deadlines for
environmental reviews and approvals should be used to motivate prompt action
from agency decision-makers. Fourth, judicial review of projects under the
National Environmental Policy Act should be streamlined and subject to time
limits that address the worst delays. Fifth, the government should sponsor more
studies of key nationwide issues—such as the environmental impact of
particular fuels or the long-term effects of increased fossil fuel infrastructure—
that otherwise may derail individual approval processes.
A. Wide Consultation, One Decision-Maker
Governments should make increased provision for wide participation in
approvals of energy infrastructure, but energy transport projects should only
require approval from federal regulators or state regulators—not both.
Whichever regulators are chosen to make this final decision should facilitate
input from all levels of government. Stakeholder interest in the global energy
industry, both within and beyond their jurisdiction, is appropriate because
carbon emissions from the energy industry affect all parts of the globe.144
Consumer interest in energy supply chains is here to stay.
At the same time, ultimate decision-making authority on energy projects
should, to the extent possible, be centralized. It is natural that stakeholders who
142 Ben Lefebvre, Russian Gas Defies U.S. Sanctions to Reach New England, POLITICO
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/26/russia-gas-sanctions-americanhomes-312866 [https://perma.cc/QFP8-HTL8].
143 Id.
144 James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87,
107–09 (2014) (describing why climate regulators must pay particular attention to carbon
emissions overseas).
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do not get their way at one level of government should seek to re-litigate the
issue at another level. But overlapping decision-makers is a recipe for
uncertainty. And there is no reason to think that subjecting each proposed
project to multiple veto gates would improve overall economic and
environmental results.145 Multiple veto gates just mean more opportunities to
kill proposed investments—and that is true whether those investments are in oil,
gas, or renewable power transport.
Congress should pass legislation to give the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission authority to approve all modes of interstate energy transport: both
power-lines and pipelines, whether they are transporting oil, gas, or power. In
effect, this would expand the system that is currently in place for natural gas
pipelines to oil pipelines and power lines. At the same time, Congress should
explicitly give FERC authority, in consultation with the Environmental
Protection Agency, to grant any permits or pre-empt any state or local laws, as
necessary, to complete construction of these federally-approved interstate
projects. There is no need to transfer all permit granting authority to the federal
agency—instead, FERC could merely step in when a necessary water quality
certification or other permit is unreasonably denied or delayed.146
Canada’s traditional system of energy regulation may be a helpful model
here. Canada has traditionally left regulation of energy production (and, to an
extent, local pollution) to each province’s sole authority, which is similar to the
traditional approach in the United States.147 But interprovincial energy transport
issues, by contrast, are for the Canadian federal government to decide; provinces
have input through the principle of cooperative federalism,148 but cannot veto—
or even “frustrate” interprovincial projects.149 Although this system is being
seriously stressed by Canadian oil pipeline politics today, this overall system
allows for wide participation in energy decision-making but ensures that each
issue is ultimately decided by a single responsible government.150
Current controversies in Canada also provide examples of how the federal
government can ensure that subnational governments grant the necessary
permits for nation-wide infrastructure—avoiding the New York Constitution

145 See generally Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional
Determinants of Economic Policy, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 58 (Stephan
Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001) (describing the concept of “veto gates”).
146 See, e.g., Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 320 (4th Cir. 2009).
147 See Fenner L. Stewart, How to Deal with a Fickle Friend? Alberta’s Troubles with
the Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy, in 2017 ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW 163,
165 (Janis P. Sarra & Barbara Romaine eds., 2018) [hereinafter Stewart, How].
148 Fenner L. Stewart, Interjurisdictional Immunity, Federal Paramountcy, Cooperative Federalism, and the Disinterested Regulator: Exploring the Elements of Canadian
Energy Federalism in the Grant Thomas Case, 33 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 227, 228–29
(2018).
149 Id. at 248; Can. W. Bank v. Alberta [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 7 (Can.); Campbell-Bennett
Ltd. v. Comstock Midwestern Ltd., [1954] S.C.R. 207, 207 (Can.).
150 Stewart, How, supra note 147, at 164.
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Pipeline scenario.151 In 2016, Kinder Morgan won federal approval to expand
its Trans Mountain pipeline, which runs West from oil fields in the province of
Alberta across the province of British Columbia to the port of Vancouver.152
The pipeline, however, is quite controversial in British Columbia.153 In fact,
British Columbia’s ruling coalition is formed by two parties who joined forces
in the province’s legislative assembly based on an agreement to “[i]mmediately
employ every tool available to the new government to stop the [federallyapproved] expansion of the Kinder Morgan pipeline.”154 In practice, this has
meant that the provincial government and local governments have slow-walked
and denied permits to Kinder Morgan as it attempts to complete expansion of
the pipeline.155
In response, the federal government has developed an expedited procedure
for excusing compliance with provincial and local ordinances that hold up
pipeline construction.156 It has already employed this authority to invalidate
various local roadblocks for the Trans Mountain pipeline such as plan approvals
and tree cutting permits that Kinder Morgan had sought to complete its
construction.157
Every national project requires numerous local permits: permits to cross
local water bodies, permits to shut down roads to bring in heavy equipment,
permits to deviate from local zoning requirements, permits for noisy
equipment.158 Groups that are unhappy with national approvals of national
infrastructure can use each of these permitting decisions as veto gates to
frustrate national policies.159 Congress should give sufficient authority to FERC
to ensure that national policy is implemented.

151 Letter from John Ferguson to Lynda Schubring, supra note 83.
152 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Pipeline Announcement, JUSTIN TRUDEAU, PRIME

MINISTER OF CAN. (Nov. 29, 2016), http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/11/29/prime-ministerjustin-trudeaus-pipeline-announcement [https://perma.cc/7N3Y-J2WF].
153 See generally 2017 Confidence and Supply Agreement between the BC Green Caucus
and the BC New Democrat Caucus, BC NEW DEMOCRAT CAUCUS 1, http://bcndpcaucus.ca/
wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/05/BC-Green-BC-NDP-Agreement_vf-May-29th2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VEH-ENSJ].
154 Id. at 5.
155 Gordon Hoekstra, B.C. Considering Appeal of NEB Dispute Process for Permitting
of
Trans
Mountain
Pipeline,
VANCOUVER
SUN
(Jan.
19,
2018),
http://vancouversun.com/business/energy/b-c-considering-appeal-of-neb-dispute-processfor-permitting-of-trans-mountain-pipeline [https://perma.cc/2HUY-DUE9].
156 Canada, National Energy Board, Board Decision: Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC,
(Alberta: NEB, Jan. 18, 2018) at 7–11.
157 Claudia Cattaneo, NEB Rules in Favour of Trans Mountain on Burnaby Bylaw
Impasse, FIN. POST (Dec. 7, 2017), http://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/
neb-rules-in-favour-of-trans-mountain-on-burnaby-bylaw-impasse [https://perma.cc/GB
2C-PV6K].
158 Klass & Minehardt, supra note 44, at 982–83.
159 See, e.g., 160 FERC ¶ 61,6065, supra note 93, at 1 (challenging a national project for
failure to meet permit requirements).
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If, alternatively, the federal government chooses to maintain the current
division between federal approval of natural gas pipelines and state-by-state
approval of oil pipelines and power lines, it should assure that only one level of
review is required: either federal or state. Thus, on one hand, federal reviews of
interstate natural gas pipelines should be supplemented with federal authority to
waive state requirements holding up those pipelines. And on the other hand, the
federal government should refrain from imposing environmental reviews on
power lines and oil pipelines, which are reviewed by the states.

B. Changes to Approval Process Should Be Prospective Only
To the extent possible, changes to the rules of environmental review and the
standards for approval should be implemented only prospectively, so that the
goalposts are not moved half-way through the review process. This would allow
continued improvement in environmental assessment while providing a measure
of certainty to investors in interstate energy transport.160
For example, scientists continue to improve techniques for assessing the
“life cycle” impacts of energy production; these assessments show the net
impact of a fuel over its full cycle from production to transport to
consumption.161 These techniques can be helpful to answer general questions
about fuel such as: When you consider the land used by corn, does ethanol really
cause less greenhouse gas emissions than gasoline? Or when you consider the
power plants that provide electricity, do electric cars cause less greenhouse gas
emissions than gasoline vehicles?162
These techniques, however, do not yet provide resolution to determine
whether a single energy transport project will raise or lower global greenhouse
gas emissions163 (and may never be able to provide this resolution).
Governments should continue attempting to improve this method of
environmental assessment but should not impose it as part of existing reviews.
Developing experimental methods of study within an environmental review
process simply imposes too much delay and uncertainty on the environmental
review process.
Judicial review of environmental reviews have a natural tendency to change
the rules midstream because judicial review is inherently backward-looking.
When a judge holds that a long-standing environmental review practice does not
160 In fact, this change would remove one current disincentive for improving
environmental review procedures: reformers would no longer have to worry about sending
current projects back to square one. See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation,
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 201–06 (2014) (evaluating the importance of timing when
considering regulatory decisions and interventions).
161 See JAMES COLEMAN ET AL., CAN. INST. RES. L., OCCASIONAL PAPER #49,
CALIBRATING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS EXPORT LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS: ACCOUNTING FOR
LEGAL BOUNDARIES AND POST-EXPORT MARKETS 1 (May 2015).
162 See Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 19, at 2.
163 Coleman, Beyond, supra note 94, at 142–45.
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comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, she holds that review
invalid. She cannot make her ruling prospective only.164 This makes the
National Environmental Policy Act a particularly dangerous tool to energy
transport investors who would like to be able to rely on a federal approval once
it is given. This problem is particularly vexing because NEPA does not include
a statute of limitations; NEPA actions are only limited by the Administrative
Procedure Act’s six-year statute of limitations.165 In theory then, a power line
or pipeline that received approval and was built in 2018 could lose its
authorization to operate due to a suit filed in 2024 (and potentially resolved
years later).166
Thus, aggressive judicial expansion of environmental reviews is a unique
danger to energy transport investment. To combat this, reviewing courts should
take two steps. First, courts should be wary of reading new procedural
requirements into environmental reviews. Time and time again, the Supreme
Court has unanimously reversed lower courts that demanded expanded
environmental reviews.167 In fact, the Supreme Court has never held that a
NEPA review was insufficient.168 The average NEPA review now takes five
years to complete and even a finding of no significant impact—a finding that a
full NEPA review is not necessary—can cover 1,200 pages.169 Any court can
find imperfect reasoning in such a gargantuan document, but courts must give
more weight to both the imperative of speeding reviews and the consistent

164 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 (1993) (“[A] rule of federal law,

once announced and applied to the parties in controversy, must be given full retroactive
effect by all courts adjudicating federal law.”). For the split rationale that the Court used to
reach this conclusion, see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991)
(Souter, J., opinion of the court) (judicial decisions are “overwhelmingly” “fully retroactive,
applying both to parties before the court and to all other by and against whom claims may
be pressed, consistent with res judicata and procedural barriers such as statute of
limitations”); id. at 546–47 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that judicial rulings may
sometimes be prospective because judges sometimes “make” law); id. at 549 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[J]udges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it, which
is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it––discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing
what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”) (emphasis omitted).
165 Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 1997).
166 If the government believed it was prejudiced by the delay, it could attempt to argue
that the decision was protected by the doctrine of laches. See id. at 631. Of course, the
government defending the permitting decision could be an entirely different government than
the one that made the initial decision, and might have an entirely different energy policy.
167 Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court:
A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1507 (2012) (“The
Supreme Court has decided seventeen cases arising under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) and the government has not only won every case, but won almost all of them
unanimously.”).
168 Id.
169 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 73.
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guidance of the Supreme Court that NEPA does not impose any procedures
beyond those “stated in the plain language of the Act.”170
Second, although courts cannot make their civil rulings prospective-only,
they can limit the practical impact of striking down an environmental review by
allowing the project proponent to continue building and operating its facility
while the federal agency supplements its environmental review.171 The energy
company building a power line or pipeline should be allowed to take the risk
that the federal agency might change its views after completing the
supplemental review ordered by the court. In most cases, by the time a court
rules that the government should have considered a question more carefully, the
government will already have asserted that it would have reached the same
decision in any event. Thus, in the run of the mill case, the government’s
supplemental court-ordered environmental review is exceedingly unlikely to
change its ultimate decision on an energy transport project. To avoid needless
delay, project proponents should be allowed to continue building their project
at their own risk.172
Finally, if courts do not moderate their demands for ever-lengthier
environmental reviews, Congress should step in to restore a balance between
making reviews more predictable and timelier while maintaining their rigor. An
amendment to NEPA would be an imprecise tool for accomplishing this
balance, but if necessary, Congress could raise the bar for winning a preliminary
injunction under NEPA or codify further deference to agency decisions. As
explained below, a more radical step would simply immunize from review any
project that had languished in the approval process for more than six years.

C. Deadlines for Environmental Reviews
Congress should mandate, and federal agencies should implement, faster
deadlines for environmental reviews of energy transport projects. The average
federal environmental impact statement currently takes five years to prepare.173
These delays make it impossible for U.S. companies to respond nimbly to the
170 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548
(1978). In other words, courts should take more seriously their oft-stated commitment not to
“flyspeck” a weighty environmental review. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v.
Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v.
Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988).
171 Ellen M. Gilmer, Sabal Trail Permits ‘Defective and Unlawful’ — Enviros, E&E
NEWS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060074237 [https://perma.cc/6HHE
-A6N8]; Ellen M. Gilmer, Shutdown Day for Southeast Pipeline? All Eyes on the Court,
E&E NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060073089 [perma.cc/3YKFSD8B].
172 This is effectively what the district court allowed in the Dakota Access case. See
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91, 109 (D.D.C.
2017).
173 See infra notes 175–177.

PIPELINES & POWER-LINES

2019]

301

shifting geography of energy supply and demand.174 And they are not necessary
to protect the environment; Canada, a nation that is arguably on the cutting edge
of environmental assessment practice, has recently proposed expanding the
scope of its environmental reviews and completing them in a maximum of 300
days—less than a year.175 There is simply no reason that a careful environmental
review should take half a decade to complete.
The NEPA environmental impact statement process has always been slow
and is getting slower. A ten-year 2008 study found that the average NEPA
review took 3.4 years and that this average time period was growing over
time.176 A 2015 Department of Energy study found that the average NEPA
review took over 4 years,177 and a 2016 review by the National Association of
Environmental Professionals found that the average review took 5.1 years to
complete.178 Some reviews last much more than a decade.179
These timelines slow U.S. companies trying to keep pace with changes in
the geography of energy supply and demand. Consider how energy markets can
change in four years:


In 2008, the U.S. Energy Information Administration projected that
the United States would have 30 Gigawatts of wind power
generation by 2015 and just 140 Megawatts of solar photovoltaic
power.180



In 2012, the United States already had installed over 39 Gigawatts
of wind power and 380 Megawatts of solar photovoltaic and was

174 See infra footnotes 179–185 and accompanying text.
175 A Proposed New Impact Assessment System, GOV’T OF CAN. (Dec. 5, 2018),

https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmentalreviews/environmental-assessment-processes.html [https://perma.cc/VJH8-LJF8]
(describing proposal). The very largest projects would be allowed double the time, 1.6 years,
which is still less than a third of the average time for a U.S. review. See infra notes 175–177.
176 Piet deWitt & Carole A. deWitt, How Long Does It Take to Prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement?, 10 ENVTL. PRAC. 164, 164 (2008).
177 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ISSUE NO. 86, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
(NEPA) LESSONS LEARNED QUARTERLY REPORT 11 (Mar. 2016), https://www.energy.gov
/sites/prod/files/2016/03/f30/LLQR-March-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXG6-YP87]. A
2014 study from the U.S. Government Accountability found that the average time for a
NEPA review was 4.6 years. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-369, NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 13 (Apr.
2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662543.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q559-QM2Z].
178 NAEP Annual National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Report for 2016, NAT’L
ASS’N OF ENVTL PROFESSIONALS (Oct. 2017) http://www.naep.org/nepa-2016-annual-report
[https://perma.cc/73X8-NSK3].
179 deWitt & deWitt, supra note 176, at 165.
180 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 142 (June 2008)
[hereinafter EIA OUTLOOK 2008] https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo08/pdf/03
83(2008).pdf [https://perma.cc/U5J6-G4TD].
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projected to have 54 Gigawatts of wind power and 2,000 Megawatts
of solar photovoltaic power installed by 2015.181


In 2008, the United States, faced with high natural gas prices, was
building multi-billion-dollar terminals to import liquefied natural
gas from countries across the world.182



In 2012, the United States, benefiting from massive new production
of natural gas was looking forward to years of low prices and a
future as a liquefied natural gas exporter.183



In 2010, U.S. oil production had fallen for four decades and stood
at 5.5 million barrels per day of oil.184 Meanwhile, the country
imported 9.4 million barrels of petroleum products per day.185



By 2014, U.S. oil production had spiked to 8.8 million barrels per
day and net imports had fallen to 5.1 million barrels per day.186

The need to shorten the absurd time frames now required to complete
environmental reviews is one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement in
investment and infrastructure policies.187 Several initiatives have been taken to
181 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 206 (June 2012)
[hereinafter EIA OUTLOOK 2012] https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo12/pdf/0383
(2012).pdf [https://perma.cc/HMQ4-PEJY].
182 EIA OUTLOOK 2008, supra note 180, at 46–49.
183 EIA OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 181, at 91–94.
184 U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., [hereinafter U.S.
Crude Oil Production] https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_m.htm
[https://perma.cc/7TY2-LGTX].
185 U.S. Net Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
[hereinafter U.S. Net Imports] https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET
&s=MTTNTUS2&f=M [https://perma.cc/3X7A-A6RE].
186 U.S. Crude Oil Production, supra note 184; U.S. Net Imports, supra note 185; see
also Crude Oil Production by State, supra note 51. In the same year, petroleum product
exports from the United States reached 4.2 million barrels per day. U.S. Exports of Crude
Oil and Petroleum Products, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist
/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTEXUS1&f=M [https://perma.cc/36AH-K5WC]. By
2017, it reached 6.3 million barrels per day. Id.
187 President Obama’s regulatory czar recently highlighted the absurdity of the current
burdensome environmental review process. Cass R. Sunstein, Trump Did Something Good
This Week, BLOOMBERG NEWS ENTER. (Aug 17, 2017) https://www.bloomberg.com/view
/articles/2017-08-17/trump-did-something-good-this-week [on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal] (“The status quo is not great. It’s ridiculous. If the permitting bureaucracy were a
supervillain, it would be the Blob. It can take several years, and millions of dollars, to obtain
environmental clearance for construction permits, even if the goal is to develop green
infrastructure and to improve the environment.”) These reviews take more than three years
on average and may last decades. deWitt & deWitt, supra note 176, at 164 (“The time to
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try to shorten these reviews.188 But these initiatives have not been sufficient—
reviews still get longer every year.189
Congress could go further and impose deadlines on environmental reviews.
In other areas, agencies have been able to implement timelines for drug
approvals.190 Two keys to this have been industry funding and agreed timelines
for review.191 And the experience of countries like Canada suggests that much
shorter deadlines—less than a year in all but the most complex cases—are
workable for environmental reviews.192 At a minimum, Congress should
mandate that all environmental reviews be completed in less than two years and
give responsible agencies financial incentives to meet these deadlines.
The most frequent criticism of such efforts is that they will lead to rushed
environmental reviews that are even more vulnerable to being invalidated by the
courts.193 But this criticism is misplaced and likely mistaken. It is misplaced
because if compliant environmental review under the National Environmental
Policy Act unavoidably requires five years then the Act, or its interpretation,
must be changed. And it is likely mistaken because if all reviews are
accomplished in a timelier fashion, it would likely change expectations of what
is feasible in a review: it is doubtful whether judges will expect agencies to
complete five years of work in two years.

prepare an EIS ranged from 51 days to 6,708 days (18.4 years). The average time for all
federal entities was 3.4 years. Average times differed significantly by year and by entity. The
time for all entities to prepare their EISs increased during our study period by an average of
37 days per year.”). And these delays often are particularly burdensome for environmentally
beneficial projects such as public transport. See, e.g., Friends of the Capital Crescent Trail
v. Fed. Transp. Admin., 253 F. Supp. 3d 296, 298–99 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 877 F.3d 1051, 1066
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (enjoining construction of the purple line mass transit system in Maryland).
188 See Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (FAST Act), Pub. L. No.
114-94, Title XLI; see also Presidential Memorandum Expediting Review of Pipeline
Projects From Cushing, Oklahoma, to Port Arthur, Texas, and Other Domestic Pipeline
Infrastructure Projects, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,891, § 1 (Mar. 28, 2012).
189 See supra notes 176–178.
190 Susan Thaul, Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDFUA): 2012 Reauthorization as
PDFUA V, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 6 (Feb. 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42366.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X5ZS-JHPK] (noting “general view” that congressionally-mandated
deadlines for Food & Drug Administration approval of new drugs “has succeeded”);
Margaret Gilhooley, Drug User Fee Reform: The Problem of Capture and a Sunset, and the
Relevance of Priorities and the Deficit, 41 N.M. L. REV. 327, 327 (2011); Robert Temple,
Commentary on “The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products”, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1877, 1878 (1996).
191 Temple, supra note 190, at 1880–81.
192 GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 175.
193 Ellen M. Gilmer, Critics on New Leasing Policy: ‘BLM Is Inviting Lawsuits’, E&E
NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060072713 [https://perma.cc/GSJ2QD32].
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D. Speeding Judicial Review Under the National Environmental Policy
Act
Even when environmental reviews have been concluded, investors cannot
count on completing their project—they can get caught in years of litigation
over the adequacy of this review. Every year, about 100 projects are challenged
under the National Environmental Policy Act, and more than half of these claims
are filed in district courts within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.194 Investors must count on the government to defend their permit,
particularly in the Ninth Circuit where project proponents have often not even
been allowed to help the government defend their permit in court.195
Plaintiffs challenging these environmental reviews enjoy average-to-aboveaverage success rates, and even if a company’s permit survives district court
review, it can be invalidated in the Court of Appeals.196 In theory, the
government could appeal a loss to the Supreme Court, but the Court has only
taken seventeen NEPA cases in the half century that the law has operated.197
Each time the Supreme Court has taken a case, the government has won; indeed
almost all of these decisions have been unanimous and several rebuked the
lower courts for requiring too much of government environmental reviews.198
But government agencies cannot count on the Supreme Court to rein in the
lower courts—the Supreme Court simply takes too few cases.199 So if the
government wants to ensure that its environmental reviews will stand—that its
half decade of environmental analysis is not struck down—it may gild the lily,
doing more and more review to avoid a loss in court. And investors look at this
process and see they will have to wait over five years for their review and, even
when that is done, may be stuck in years of further litigation.200
To streamline these reviews, Congress should take two steps. First, NEPA
challenges to FERC approvals of natural gas projects already receive expedited
review starting in the Courts of Appeals: either the D.C. Circuit or the Circuit
where the company’s headquarters is located.201 All energy projects, including

194 David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in

Environmental Litigation, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 7–8 (2018).
195 Churchill Cty. v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by 158
F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 1998).
196 Churchill, 150 F.3d at 1082–83.
197 Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Reflections on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
231, 231 (2012).
198 Id. at 248.
199 Id. at 231.
200 See Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 194, at 38 (noting that 25% of district court
cases under NEPA last from 3.25–10 years).
201 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (2005).
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solar farms on federal land, and power-lines to support those projects, should
receive expedited review in the D.C. Circuit.202
Second, when a company is forced to wait an unreasonable length of time
for a permit, that permit should eventually be immunized from invalidation
under NEPA. After all, if a government issues an environmental impact
statement and permit six years after a project is proposed, what is the benefit of
allowing judicial review of that environmental impact statement? The
environmental review took six years. If a court believes that is still not enough
review, what more would it like: twelve years of review?
And if the government’s review is still truly inadequate after six years, why
should the private company building the project be punished further? If the
government had wanted to, it could have denied the permit at any time in the
preceding six years. If it remained committed to the project through multiple
administrations and successive congresses, what practical purpose is achieved
by further delay?
If NEPA review was precluded after some interval—whether six years,
eight years, or ten—the government would still have an incentive to issue timely
reviews.203 Project proponents do not want to wait six years for a permit—they
would like their reviews and permitting completed within one or two years. But
a time limit would solve the worst cases of delay and address investors’ worst
fears.

202 See, e.g., Sherwood v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 842 F.3d 400, 402 (6th Cir. 2016) (power
line right-of-way vegetation-maintenance policy); Sherwood v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 590
F.App’x 451, 456 (6th Cir. 2014) (same); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Semonite, 311
F. Supp. 3d 350, 358–59 (D.D.C. 2017) appeal docketed, No. 18-5179 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10,
2018) (Surry-Skiffes Creek-Whealton electrical infrastructure project); Nat’l Parks
Conservation Ass’n v. Jewell, 965 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2013) (Susquehanna-Roseland
transmission line); John O’Connell, Environmental Group Appeals Gateway West Line,
CAPITAL PRESS (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.capitalpress.com/state/idaho/environmentalgroup-appeals-gateway-west-line/article_50b3df9f-1131-5175-a4f0-8c261b853da9.html
[https://perma.cc/7PW8-KU2V] (reporting on the Bureau of Land Management approval of
a high-voltage transmission power line through public land); Two Lawsuits Seek to Block
Project Approvals Based on Failure to Mitigate Climate Change Impacts, MARTEN LAW
(Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20090826-lawsuits-to-blockproject-approvals [https://perma.cc/YCR3-YFHE] (‘“Sunrise Powerlink Transmission
Project’ which was proposed by San Diego Gas & Electric Company in 2005 and approved
by the California Public Utilities Commission . . . .”); Bruce A. Scruton, Power Line Foes
Fault $60M Deal with Park, N.J. HERALD (June 12, 2013), https://www.njherald.com/story/
22567023/power-line-foes-fault-60m-deal-with-park#// [https://perma.cc/C73H-CBBF]
(describing the Susquehanna-Roseland transmission line).
203 Of course, if an energy transport company fails to give the federal government key
information that it needs to make a decision in a timely fashion, the federal government
should be allowed to delay the decision further.
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E. Wider Study of Cross-Cutting Issues
There are some cross-cutting issues that tend to arise in multiple individual
permitting decisions. For instance: What is the impact of wind power on avian
populations? What is the life-cycle impact of natural gas or oil produced by
fracking? What level of natural gas infrastructure would be compatible with
meeting U.S. climate goals? These are important questions that cannot be fully
resolved in individual permitting decisions. The federal government should
invest in studies that carefully address these questions on a nationwide level and
are designed to be used in individual permitting decisions.
For instance, if an agency like FERC did a careful study of what level of
fossil fuel pipeline infrastructure build-out would likely be built if the country
adopted an optimal carbon tax, or if the nation met its current greenhouse gas
reduction goals, that study could be a relevant consideration in pipeline and
transmission approvals. Giving due credit to the distributed knowledge reflected
by markets,204 if the pipeline build out was faster than anticipated, that could
signal either (1) that the previous studies, like so many energy studies, had failed
to predict market developments, (2) that new pipelines should not be approved,
or (3) that the country was not willing to abide by the strict limits reflected in
theoretical commitments to price carbon or reduce emissions.
Thus, these studies, unlike assessments of individual infrastructure, would
be able to provide useful information because they would take advantage of
existing life-cycle analyses’s focus on large scale markets where more
information may be a public good because of its wide benefits, rather than the
project-level decisions that are better studied by individual companies with
money on the line.205 Again, these studies would likely not be a determinative
factor in any review: inconsistencies between the study and infrastructure
investment would be more likely to result from the study’s necessary generality
204 See generally Scott Shane, Prior Knowledge and the Discovery of Entrepreneurial
Opportunities, 11 ORG. SCI. 44869 (2000) (arguing that “opportunity discovery is a function
of the distribution of information in society”).
205 There is little reason, however, to think that pipeline companies regularly build
projects that would not have been viable in a world where carbon was priced. After all, fossil
fuel companies are more likely than any broad category of industry to make decisions based
on the assumption that carbon will be priced in the future. See Feike Sijbesma, Running the
Race Together, 2017-2018 CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COALITION REPORT 6 (2018),
https://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/carbon-pricing-leadership-report
[https://perma.cc/CN5V-A83P]; EXXONMOBIL, ENERGY & CARBON–MANAGING THE RISKS
17 (2009), https://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/global/files/energy-and-environment/
report---energy-and-carbon---managing-the-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SKT-7R9R]
(planning for carbon prices ranging from $20/ton to above $40/ton); Letter to Shareholders,
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 2 (May 16, 2014), https://www.shell.com/investors/environmentalsocial-and-governance/sri-news-presentations-and-annual-briefings/_jcr_content/par/tab
bedcontent/tab_667142067/textimage_1262076677.stream/1519763050501/9fac753c6798
5b2e3b7e123534a1c27c97ab400ca35647b4271b2ed5342be6c3/sri-web-response-climatechange-may14.pdf [https://perma.cc/V582-DYTN].
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and forward looking nature. But, over time, they could be calibrated to improve
the country’s energy transport infrastructure forecasting.206

VI. CONCLUSION
For a century the United States has relied on two principle sources of
energy: coal for electricity and oil for transport. Coal and oil are cheap and easy
to transport, crisscrossing the country every day by rail, barge, pipeline, truck,
and tanker. But they come at an environmental cost: burning these fossil fuels
pollutes the air that we breathe and warms the globe.
The United States now has a golden opportunity to transition to cleaner
sources of energy, with more and more transportation powered by electricity,
and more electricity powered by natural gas and renewables. And new
technology has suddenly made these energy sources even cheaper than other
fuels in much of the country.
But there is a catch: gas and power are much, much more expensive to
transport to energy users across the United States. Without massive new
investments in energy transport, these resources will largely go to waste. And,
at the same moment, energy transport infrastructure has grown more
controversial due to a complex mix of environmental concerns, state and federal
jockeying for power, and landowner concerns.
Congress and the courts must provide energy transport investors with a
stable, predictable, and timely process to build the pipelines and power-lines
that can build a cleaner energy future. By working together investors and
policymakers can ensure that the United States reaps the full environmental,
economic, and security benefits of its new energy boom.

206 Thus far, the United States has made little systematic effort to identify these issues

or produce studies designed to enable individual permitting decisions. For example, in its
recent guidance on considering greenhouse gas emissions in National Environmental Policy
Act decisions the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality suggested reliance on the
Department of Energy’s study of the climate impact of liquefied natural gas exports.
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES ON CONSIDERATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT REVIEWS 16 (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/08/f33/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74LY-Q4QT]. But that study only compared gas exports to other fossil
fuels such as coal. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB. (NETL), LIFE CYCLE
GREENHOUSE GAS PERSPECTIVE ON EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM UNITED
STATES 18 (May 2014).

